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 Foreword
The public accountability and political credibility of Parliaments are cornerstone principles, to 
which all OSCE participating States have subscribed. During the Copenhagen Meeting on the 
Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1990, OSCE 
participating States declared that “the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through 
periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government”. 
In the Paris Document (1990), they unanimously affirmed that “[d]emocracy, with its representa-
tive and pluralistic character, entails accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public 
authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially”. Finally, in the Istanbul 
Document (1999), the OSCE participating States pledged to strengthen their efforts to “promote 
good government practices and public integrity” in a concerted effort to fight corruption.
The regulation of parliamentary behaviour and ethics standards is an essential element to 
secure public trust in the efficacy, transparency and equity of democratic systems, as well as to 
foster a culture of public service that favours public interest over private gains. Various regula-
tory models exist in parliamentary systems for conduct control, with a visible trend towards 
the explicit “codification,” i.e., in “Codes of Conduct”, of acceptable standards of parliamentary 
behaviour and ethics. Indeed, recurrent scandals and controversies in parliamentary democ-
racies suggest that reform of ethics regulations, carried out in an inclusive, transparent and 
consultative manner, could be an important element in restoring trust in democratic systems 
of governance.
Some OSCE participating States have developed and adopted principles and codes of conduct 
or ethics for public officials and parliamentarians. Although rules of conduct for parliamentar-
ians existed in the past, these rules have typically been limited to the parliamentary arena. 
Moreover, in recent years a deepening schism between voters and their elected representatives 
has become increasingly clear. For example, trust in national parliaments within the European 
Union fell from 57 per cent in 2007 to 31 per cent in 2012.1
Public concerns emerging from surveys of public perceptions generally relate to financial mat-
ters and conflicts of interest, level of attendance at parliamentary sessions and committee 
meetings, use of privileged information and misuse of parliamentary allowances. 
1 European Commission, “Public Opinion in the European Union – First Results”, Standard Eurobarometer 77, 
Spring 2012, p. 13, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_first_en.pdf >.
6In most OSCE participating States, however, the conduct of parliamentarians is regulated by 
articles of national constitutions and elements of several laws (related to rules for public of-
fice holders, on conflict of interest, on asset declarations and on parliament, as well as the 
Criminal Code or Administrative Offences Code). It can be argued that there is, therefore, no 
need for a separate code of conduct or ethics for members of parliaments (MPs). Indeed, many 
parliaments have not developed codes of conduct or ethics, preferring to rely on professional 
standards that exist in the “web” of laws, including their own rules of procedure and standing 
orders. 
As of 2012, 13 parliaments in the OSCE region had adopted codes of ethics and conduct. 
Although the number may seem low, these parliaments represent 607.5 million people, that 
is to say 50 per cent of the OSCE region’s population. Moreover, the introduction of codes of 
conduct is a growing trend that takes into account new dynamics such as higher public expec-
tations for public representatives, as well as politicians’ demand for increased guidance and 
advice in their ethical decision-making.
The 1992 Helsinki Document set out the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) mandate to help OSCE participating States “build, strengthen and protect democratic 
institutions”. In accordance with its mandate, and through its Democratic Governance pro-
gramme, ODIHR delivers projects and activities that aim to raise awareness of the key role of 
democratic institutions – in particular parliaments − in upholding democratic principles. In 
this effort, ODIHR partners with parliamentary support programmes implemented by indi-
vidual OSCE Field Operations. 
This study was undertaken by ODIHR with the fundamental objective of developing a practical 
tool that draws upon academic research and practical experience in OSCE participating States. 
The aim of this study is to identify the main concerns and possible obstacles that need to be 
considered while reforming, developing and designing parliamentary standards of conduct, in-
cluding, but not limited to, codes of conduct. In the fast-changing field of parliamentary ethics, 
this publication favours a snapshot approach of currently existing codes of conduct or ethics in 
the OSCE region over rigorous cross-country analysis. The cases selected are skewed towards 
countries where such codes exist.
This Background Study: Professional and Ethical Standards for Parliamentarians purports to be 
a comprehensive but practical publication that analyses how to build and reform systems that 
set professional and ethical standards for Members of Parliament (MPs) and regulate their 
conduct to ensure that those standards are met. The targeted audience can use this publication 
in different ways:
• For MPs, parliamentary staff and experts from academia and civil society, it can serve as 
an overview publication outlining the key issues in developing and reforming professional 
and ethical standards for members of parliament, drawing upon OSCE participating States’ 
examples and practices;
• For OSCE Field Operations, as well as other international organizations, it can provide an 
additional tool for delivering expertise through capacity-building, training and advice to 
MPs and parliamentary staff, as part of parliamentary-strengthening projects or based on 
direct requests from parliaments. 
We hope that this publication provides a valuable overview of the topic and will kick off an 
innovative dialogue and exchange among OSCE participating States, international organiza-
tions, media and civil society on the subject of regulation of parliamentary conduct and ethics. 
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Executive Summary
The OSCE Human Dimension commitments on democratic institutions state that “the partici-
pating States recognize that vigorous democracy depends on the existence as an integral part 
of national life of democratic values and practices as well as an extensive range of democratic 
institutions.”2 This means that, in addition to building democratic institutions, it is critical to 
ensure that the individuals who work in public life adhere to certain professional and ethical 
standards. This applies to both mature democracies and to those where democratic institu-
tions are still ‘under construction’. Across the OSCE region3, there is a growing consensus that 
professional and ethical standards for parliamentarians are critical to strengthening good 
governance, public integrity and the rule of law.4 
In this regard in its 2006 Brussels Declaration, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), 
after recognizing that good governance, particularly in national representative bodies, is fun-
damental to the healthy functioning of democracy, encouraged all parliaments of the OSCE 
participating States to:
• develop and publish rigorous standards of ethics and official conduct for parliamentarians 
and their staff;
• establish efficient mechanisms for public disclosure of financial information and potential 
conflicts of interests by parliamentarians and their staff; and
2 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 
1990, section III, para. 26, < http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304>.
3 This study seeks to provide examples of the range of ways in which a number of OSCE participating States 
address the issue of professional and ethical standards for parliamentarians. Appropriate examples have been 
chosen from among these countries to illustrate certain points. 
4 This study uses the term “professional and ethical standards for parliamentarians” as an umbrella term for the 
rules and norms relevant to the conduct of parliamentary work. The term is intended to include standards that 
are enshrined in laws and written rules, but also to recognize that some of the expectations that the public has 
of parliamentarians derive from a broader and less tangible concept of what constitutes “ethical” behavior. 
The definition of ethical conduct is likely to change over time and is shaped by local norms, as well as by a soci-
ety’s aspirations for its political institutions.
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• establish an office of public standards to which complaints about violations of standards by 
parliamentarians and their staff may be made. 5
Indeed, the establishment and enforcement of such standards and mechanisms provides an im-
portant bridge between building the institutions of democracy and establishing a democratic 
political culture.
Why reform standards? 
There are four main reasons why OSCE participating States might want to consider reforming 
professional and ethical standards for parliamentarians. These are to:
• Fight corruption − Robust standards and regulation can help to prevent abuse of office and 
other forms of corruption by: setting out clear rules for how MPs should behave, monitoring 
how they actually behave, and punishing transgressions. The role of an MP is complex and 
can raise a number of ethical dilemmas. Clear and consistently enforced standards provide 
greater clarity for MPs and their staff about how the public expects them to behave, espe-
cially after a scandal in which good faith mistakes have been made. Regulation should not 
interfere with the exercise of parliamentary duties, for example, by requiring deputies to 
engage in unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, but it should create a fair and stable envi-
ronment in which MPs can perform their roles of representation, scrutiny and legislation; 
• Boost accountability and trust − Clear parliamentary ethical standards improve ac-
countability by giving the public and the media clear benchmarks against which to judge 
parliamentary conduct. If people believe that the system for regulating ethics is fair and 
effective, then they can more easily trust parliament to get on with its job, in the knowledge 
that any transgressions will come to light and will be punished;6 
• Professionalise politics − Historically, MPs have been elected to parliament from a vari-
ety of backgrounds and occupations, and this variety is important to their ability to repre-
sent voters. However, once in parliament, MPs need to adhere to the same rules about how 
they conduct themselves in office. Just as lawyers and doctors have shared standards across 
the profession, MPs need clarity about the standards expected of them. Clear standards can 
also help to unite MPs, allowing them to overcome the obvious political differences and to 
build a sense of collegiality. They can also boost the prestige of the office, helping to attract 
high-calibre individuals to the role; and
• Meet international standards − The introduction of codes of conduct for public offi-
cials, promoting integrity, honesty and responsibility, also demonstrates a country’s com-
mitment to the implementation and respect of shared international standards and norms. 
Compliance with such norms can also be important to meeting the conditions for joining 
international associations or accessing aid. 
5 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, “Brussels Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions 
Adopted at the 15th Annual Session”, Brussels, 2006, pp. 32–33, <http://www.oscepa.org/images/stories/docu-
ments/declarations/2006_-_brussels_final_declaration_-_english.2326.pdf>. (OSCE PA)
6 The argument can also be made, however, that conduct regulation may damage public trust in politicians by bring-
ing into public view scandals that otherwise remain hidden. See European Commission Study, European Institute of 
Public Administration, “Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union”, 2007, 
p. 121, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/hpo_professional_ethics_en.pdf>. (EC EIPA)
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How to reform standards
Many parliaments across the OSCE region are seeking to reform professional and ethical 
standards. This study is about how to set up systems to ensure that members behave profession-
ally, i.e., that they effectively undertake a specialized set of tasks intrinsic to the role, and ethi-
cally, i.e., in line with values regarding what constitutes right and proper behaviour for an MP. 
It is not possible to prescribe a single one-size-fits-all solution for improving parliamentary 
ethical standards. The most effective strategies are those that take into account specific insti-
tutional and political conditions. Reformers might find it helpful to start by identifying the 
key risks or problems in their political systems as well as taking into account international 
standards, the constitutional context and existing laws. Such an exercise can help with assess-
ing what type of tools and practices are needed in that particular context. This study shares 
experiences about how systems of parliamentary standards operate across the OSCE region 
and is intended as a resource for reformers. 
There are several key instruments for regulating different aspects of parliamentary conduct:
• Codes of conduct7 − A code of conduct sets out guidelines for the behaviour of members 
of a particular profession. Such codes play various roles in different constitutional contexts. 
Some are detailed lists of rules embedded in legally binding documents such as parlia-
mentary rules of procedure, as with the German and Latvian codes. Others are simply 
brief statements of shared values, such as the United Kingdom House of Commons Code 
(although the latter is accompanied by a lengthy guide). Codes are not essential and many 
countries regulate parliamentary standards effectively without adopting codes. However, 
they can be a useful tool for collating all of the rules in one place, providing a benchmark 
against which to judge conduct, and setting out general values and principles. Moreover, in 
all countries, the process of drafting such a code can be highly beneficial, since it tends to 
initiate a broad discussion about what professional and ethical standards can – and should 
− be expected of parliamentarians. Drafting a new code can, therefore, be an excellent way 
of initiating a process of reforming standards;
• Registers of interests and asset declarations − One of the main threats to professional 
and ethical conduct for parliamentarians arises from “conflicts of interest”, i.e., situations 
where MPs must choose between the duties and demands of their professional role and 
their own private interests. Most parliaments have rules about what interests MPs can pos-
sess simultaneously while holding their office. Certain types of interests tend to be allowed 
but, to guard against conflicts, MPs can be asked to provide information about their assets 
and interests. This data is either monitored by the parliament or publicly disclosed. The ad-
vantage of public disclosure is that it allows the media and civil society to assess whether 
the work of MPs is subject to influence by their private interests. However, concerns related 
to privacy infringements need to be addressed with sensitivity to the local context;
• Rules about allowances and expenses − MPs need adequate resources to carry out their 
duties effectively and, hence, need allowances from the state to support their local offices, 
to fund travel and other necessary expenses. However, MPs should exercise responsibility 
7 The terms “code of conduct” and “code of ethics” are sometimes used interchangeably and may have different 
connotations in different languages. This study uses the term “code of conduct”, but do not intend to exclude 
systems that prefer the other term.
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in the way they spend public money. Parliamentary resources should be used only for public 
work, and should in no circumstances be used for political party campaigning or personal 
benefit. MPs’ freedom to use allowances needs to be regulated so as to avoid abuses and 
inspire the confidence of the public; and
• Other aspects of conduct − The reform of rules also provides an opportunity to incorpo-
rate and address considerations relating to relations with lobbyists, demeanour, parliamen-
tary language, equal treatment relating to gender or ethnicity, and standards for attend-
ance. Rules may also give guidance on how to manage the representation of constituents. It 
may also be necessary to regulate the post-parliamentary employment of MPs, given their 
potential after leaving office to take private-sector jobs that pose conflicts of interest. 
Monitoring and enforcement
Once the rules are in place, it is necessary to set up clear and consistent procedures for moni-
toring breaches of the rules, investigating whether misconduct has occurred and punishing 
offenders. One major question to consider is whether parliament should be trusted to regulate 
itself, for example through a special ethics committee, or whether investigations should rather 
be entrusted to an external regulator, such as an anti-corruption agency. 
Self-regulation has traditionally been preferred, largely because of the need to protect parlia-
ments’ independence from the executive branch. Yet recent years have seen a move towards 
external regulation, partly reflecting a loss of confidence in parliaments’ ability to regulate 
themselves following a succession of scandals. External regulation is often seen as more cred-
ible and less vulnerable to politicisation. Whichever approach is adopted, it is important that 
the body responsible for enforcing professional ethical standards in parliament is regarded as 
legitimate and that its procedures are transparent. Any sanctions imposed should be propor-
tionate to the severity of the misconduct. 
Initiating and sustaining reform
Systems to regulate the ethical conduct of parliamentarians work best when MPs themselves 
feel “ownership” of the system. This is best achieved by having an open and consultative 
process to discuss what is not working and design solutions to address concerns. Working 
groups established to lead reform should be selected through a fair and transparent process 
and should lead by example in making their work transparent and declaring their members’ 
special interests, even beyond the requirements of the main parliament. Ideally, they should 
be led by or include individuals who are widely regarded as ethical leaders and who inspire 
public confidence. Any form of regulation implies administrative costs, which should be taken 
into account by reformers when devising new rules. However, major improvements to parlia-
mentary standards can be achieved through transparency and accountability initiatives, which 
are highly cost-effective. 
It is essential to keep the rules operational and flexible. For parliamentarians, this means 
ensuring that new members are briefed on the rules when they enter parliament, building in 
regular opportunities to review and update the rules, and providing support to members who 
seek advice on the rules. It is also critical to educate the public and the media to encourage 
them to hold MPs to account and also to set reasonable boundaries on the scrutiny of MPs’ 
personal lives, so that MPs can retain some privacy. 
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Table 1: Key elements of a parliamentary standards system 
Institution Description Objectives Points to consider
Code of conduct Written list of principles 
and/or rules to guide 
conduct
Provide clarity to MPs 
about expectations.
Facilitate accountability
• Compatibility with 
existing laws?
• Principles or rules?
• Accompanying guide to 
the code of conduct?
Registery of Interests Centralized list of the 
private interests of MPs 
that could influence or 
appear to influence their 
decisions
Ensure that private 
interests do not influence 
MPs’ judgement
• What needs to be 
registered?
• Who will get access?
• What about privacy 
concerns?
Declaration of Assets Statement listing total 
assets of an individual 
MP
Deter corruption by 
allowing scrutiny of 
assets gained while in 
public office
• How are declarations 
submitted 
(electronically, paper, 
etc)?
• Should declarations be 
publicly disclosed?
• Do family members 
need to make 
declarations?
• Can declarations be 
checked against tax 
returns?
Expenses and 
allowances
Rules about what 
expenses are permissible 
and accounting
Ensure that public money 
is not wasted or used to 
supplement income
• Should allowances 
differ for different 
types of MPs?
• Should MPs’ 
expenditures be 
centralized?
Conduct in the 
chamber
Rules about conduct 
within debates, respect 
for colleagues, language 
to be used or avoided, 
dress code
Ensure that parliament 
operates professionally 
and is able to perform its 
duties, that there is an 
atmosphere of respect 
for one’s colleagues
• Should demeanour be 
regulated?
• Are informal practices 
in the chamber 
inhibiting debate?
• Are gender and ethnic 
equality upheld?
Rules about relations 
with lobbyists
Rules and restrictions 
on the kinds of relations 
that MPs can have with 
lobbyists and interest 
groups
Ensure that MPs do not 
abuse office, receiving 
money from lobbyists 
in exchange of political 
favours
• What kind of 
information should be 
provided in a registry 
of lobbyists?
• What is the balance 
between good lobbying 
and improper political 
influence?
Part One: Preparing to Reform 
Parliamentary Ethical Standards
This study is about how to build reform and uphold professional and ethical standards for MPs. 
These particular standards might be embodied in formal institutions, such as the constitution, 
specific laws and written rules, but they also comprise informal institutions, such as norms 
and traditions.
Section 1.1 considers the main reasons to regulate parliamentary ethical standards and the 
conduct of MPs, with Section 1.2 pointing out the limits of regulation.
Section 1.3 evaluates the issue of immunity for parliamentarians, and how this concept can be 
rationalized into an ethical code of conduct for MPs. 
To conclude, Section 1.4 examines the general framework that defines ethical standards, iden-
tifying four different layers of normative sources: international norms, constitutional norms 
and national law, parliamentary norms, and social norms and the role of political parties. 
1.1 Reasons to Regulate Conduct
The regulation of ethical standards plays a critical role in ensuring that the conduct of MPs is 
not merely in line with a country’s constitution or laws but also meets public expectations about 
how parliamentarians should behave. After all, voters often hold MPs to account for failing to 
live up to ethical standards, even when they have not explicitly broken a law.
Perhaps the primary reason why it is important to establish and regulate parliamentary ethi-
cal standards is to raise the degree of professionalism into politics. Many professions have 
systems of standards to guide the conduct of their members. These rules are often written 
down in codes of conduct, which members are required to sign or take an oath to uphold on 
upon entering the profession. Doctors, for example, have been taking the Hippocratic Oath 
since antiquity as a commitment to executing their medical duties in an ethical way. Just like 
members of other professions, MPs too should agree to behave professionally, i.e., to effectively 
carry out a specialized set of tasks, and ethically, i.e., in line with values regarding what consti-
tutes proper behaviour for an MP. This is nothing new. Pericles made the Athenian Code a criti-
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cal foundation of ancient Greek politics and culture.8 However, the job of being an MP entails 
special responsibilities. Members of parliament are elected to serve the public interest, but in 
order to do so they need power to represent their constituencies, and access to exercise their 
oversight role in various forms. With such power comes the potential to abuse their position 
and serve private interests rather than the public interest. 
There are several types of unethical political conduct that a parliamentary system should 
guard against. Conflicts of interest arise when MPs have private interests that “improperly 
influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities.”9 A conflict of interest 
might occur, for example, if a member owns a company in the construction sector and, in his 
or her role as a legislator, is required to vote on a new law regulating safety in construction. 
There is a concern that he or she will put his or her desire to earn income from the company 
above his or her duties as a legislator to serve the public interest. Bribery occurs when an MP 
accepts a gift or payment in return for voting in a certain way on a bill, or raising an issue in 
a debate. MPs might also be accused of abuse of office or misuse of public funds if they use 
their powers or parliamentary resources in ways that serve private interests at the expense of 
the public interest. MPs that use their power or public resources specifically to benefit their 
friends or family might be guilty of nepotism. 
A recent Eurobarometer survey found that such forms of corruption are perceived to be wide-
spread among national politicians in many European Union countries (see Figure 1 below). 
Figure 1. Perceptions of corruption among national politicians in the European Union10
8 Gilman, Stuart Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting an Ethical and Professional Public Service: 
Comparative Successes and Lessons, (Washington, DC: PREM/World Bank), 2005, p. 3. 
9 OECD, “Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences”, 2003, and 
OECD, Asset Declarations for Public Officials: a Tool to Prevent Corruption, (OECD Publishing: 2011), p.28, 
 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264095281-en>. (OECD Asset Declarations) 
 Note: Conflicts of interest are not necessarily forms of corruption, but they represent a risk of corruption.
10 The question asked was “Do you think that the giving and taking of bribes, and the abuse of positions of power 
for personal gain, are widespread among any of the following?” (Options: Politicians at national level; Politicians 
at regional level; Politicians at local level). The country acronyms are the ISO 3166 Standard Country Codes. See: 
European Commission, “Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption”, 2009, Special Eurobarometer 325, p. 28, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_325_en.pdf>.
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It is essential that the public has confidence in parliament and that any apparent breaches of 
trust are investigated and, if necessary, punished. Pressures to reform parliamentary standards 
or introduce new rules often arise because of a scandal whereby an individual MP – or group of 
MPs – is seen to have breached public trust. Political scandals – in particular those regarding 
ethics – can be very damaging to perceptions of legitimacy in a democracy, but they can also 
open up windows of opportunity to reform or tighten regulation of parliamentary conduct.11
Indeed, scandals have been critical in prompting the reform of parliamentary standards in 
many countries. In the United States, the Watergate scandal in 1974 helped pave the way for 
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which set out requirements for financial disclosure by 
employees and officials in the legislature, executive and judiciary. In the United Kingdom, 
the 1996 “cash for questions” affair – where MPs were found to have taken cash bribes for 
raising certain questions in parliament – prompted the Prime Minister to ask the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life to investigate standards in public life in Britain. The resulting 
“Nolan Principles” informed the work of the House of Commons Committee on Standards and 
Privileges as it drafted the first code of conduct for deputies in the United Kingdom.12
More recently, in January 2011, three Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were caught 
on camera appearing to be willing to move amendments in return for cash. One of them report-
edly boasted that he was earning hundreds of thousands of euro from other lobbyists.13 In the 
European Parliament, the scandal led to the drafting of a new code of conduct, which explicitly 
bans the acceptance of rewards in exchange for influencing votes. The code, which came into 
effect in January 2012, also requires MEPs to declare activities that might constitute a conflict 
of interest, bans gifts worth more than 150 euros, and sets up a five-member committee to ad-
vise on the code and investigate alleged breaches.14 Possible sanctions include forfeiting daily 
subsistence allowances for two to 10 days, suspension from parliamentary work – apart from 
the right to vote – for two to ten days, and even the loss of an elected parliamentary role (e.g., 
chair of a committee). 15
11 Stapenhurst, Frederick and Pelizzo, Riccardo, ‘Legislative Ethics and Codes of Conduct’, WBI Working Papers, 
(Washington DC: World Bank Institute, 2004), p. 4.
12 As a result, the Committee adopted the so-called “Nolan Principles” for public life. These principles were seen as 
being essential to “all aspects of public life”, and include: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, open-
ness, honesty and leadership. More information can be found at <http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/About/
The_7_Principles.html>. 
13 The Sunday Times, “Euro MPs exposed in ‘cash-for-laws’ scandal”, 20 March 2011, < http://www.thesundaytimes.
co.uk/sto/news/insight/article582604.ece>.
14 The Code is Annex 1 to European Parliament, “Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament”, Brussels, 2012,
 <http: //www.europarl .europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULES-EP+20120110+ANN-
01+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&navigationBar=YES>. 
15 The right to vote is retained because its removal would interfere with the representation of voters and might 
also alter a parliamentary group’s majority.
“Why is it necessary to elaborate a code of conduct? Very often, elected officials forget that they should work for 
public instead of personal interests. Very often, MPs forget that they shouldn’t support interests of some individuals 
or groups of individuals wanting to achieve some personal or indirect benefit. This code should remind them of that.” 
(Nermina Kapetanović MP, Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
[Comments made at an OSCE Conference: Standards of Ethics and Conduct for Parliamentarians in Belgrade, 
November 2011]
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The same scandal also prompted reforms in Austria. One Austrian expert commentator noted:
“[the European Parliament case] exposed weaknesses in the Austrian system since this action would 
not have been punishable under Austrian law had the MEP been an MP in the national parliament.”16
Shortly after the scandal, one of the political parties in the Austrian Parliament issued an eth-
ics declaration condemning politicians who act in their own personal financial interests and 
exhorting them to instead act out of conviction and be driven by ideals; the party has since 
upgraded this to a new party-level code of conduct. This sparked a major political debate and, 
in the summer of 2012, a “Transparency Package” was passed by the Austrian Parliament in 
an attempt to restore trust in politicians. This includes new laws on party financing with limits 
to donations and sponsorship, and new laws on lobbying and the acceptance of gifts.17 Laws 
on incompatibility have also become stricter, and deputies are required to give more detailed 
information on income earned outside of Parliament, as well as providing information on hon-
orary posts.18 
Reforms, however, are not always triggered by scandals. Indeed, there is a widespread trend 
towards more explicit regulation of a number of public offices. In younger democracies, reform 
of the regulation around standards may be intended to build or transform a political culture. 
Also in older democracies, reform of parliamentary standards is often motivated by a sense 
among parliamentarians that this is a requirement of modern political life or a realization dur-
ing a routine review that rules are no longer functioning well. Bodies that interact with MPs 
and public officials are also increasingly subject to regulation. For example, codes of conduct 
are being introduced for lobbyists in many countries. 
Having clear standards facilitates the operation of a democratic system, by helping other in-
stitutions to hold parliament and parliamentarians to account. Indeed, having clear stand-
ards may be beneficial for MPs in an environment where media scrutiny is intense. Arjen 
Westerhoff, a parliamentary official from the Netherlands, explained that reforms in his coun-
try were pursued because: 
“It was thought appropriate and part of modern times to make sure that the reputation of our parlia-
ment and our members would not be vulnerable to any false accusations”.19 
This need to protect parliament’s reputation is often mentioned explicitly in codes of conduct; 
in the Polish Sejm’s Code of Ethics, for example, “care for the good name of the Sejm” is one of 
the five core principles.20
However, there may not be consensus about how MPs should behave. Frequently, there are 
competing views about what constitutes the “proper” way to act and what is deemed corrupt. 
16 Prof. Dr. Melanie Sully, Vice-President, Institute for Parliamentarism and Democracy Questions, Austria. 
Comment made in a written submission for this project to OSCE/ODIHR.
17 Bundeskanzleramt, Austria, “Federal government adopted „transperancy package,““:<http://www.bka.gv.at/site/
infodate__21.05.2012/7648/default.aspx#id47762>. 
18 Some elements of the package were effective as of 1 July 2012, others will be as of 1 January 2013. More 
details on the laws passed are given on the homepage of the Austrian parliament (currently only in German) 
<http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2012/PK0550/>. 
19 Telephone interview conducted for this study, 30 September 2011.
20 For more information, see <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/zep.htm>.
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What is acceptable in one country might be unacceptable in another, and behaviour that was 
tolerated ten or 20 years ago might be frowned upon today. 
The following questions illustrate some areas of controversy:
• Is it acceptable for MPs to employ their spouses or children to work as their assistants, paid 
for by public funds? 
• Is it acceptable for MPs to receive funding for running a constituency office from their 
private property?
• Is it appropriate for an MP to accept gifts or hospitality from a major business in his or her 
constituency? 
• Should MPs decide their own salaries?
• Should MPs be allowed to serve as city mayors in parallel to their parliamentary role? What 
about sitting on the board of a company? 
• Is it cause for concern if an MP who serves, for example, on the Defence Committee in par-
liament then takes a job with a defence company when he or she leaves office?
• Is it ethical for an MP to receive campaign funding from a company that has directly ben-
efited from his or her voting record?
• In what circumstances is it acceptable to lift an MP’s immunity from prosecution? Who 
should decide?
Sometimes, the answers to these questions are provided by a country’s constitution or laws. 
But, in most political systems, at least some of these questions pose dilemmas that do not 
have clear answers but could potentially lead to scandals that would damage public trust and 
perhaps cost an MP his or her seat. Professional standards should provide guidance to MPs on 
how to navigate some of these dilemmas. 
Uncertainty about what is or is not ethical may be particularly common in democratizing 
countries, where old norms have been rejected but new ones are not yet consolidated. In all 
societies, though, standards – and expectations about conduct – change over time. Although 
systems for regulating standards draw upon international commitments and experience, they 
must ultimately be home-grown and tailored to each country’s individual constitutional ma-
chinery and political culture. 
“When deputies from different parties arrange 
freely, through dialogue and compromise, an ethical 
system they will respect and publicise…we can 
expect our citizens to evaluate us positively and 
support us” 
Slavica Djukić-Dejanović, President of the National 
Assembly of Serbia (Comments at ODIHR conference 
in Belgrade November 2011)
A ruling by the German Constitutional Court in 2007 described the importance of transparency for building 
trust in parliament: “Parliamentary democracy is based on the confidence of the people; trust without transparency, 
which allows one to follow what is happening in politics, is not possible. […] The voter must know whom he chooses. 
[…]. Such knowledge is important not only for the voting decision. It also ensures the ability of the German Parliament 
and its members, [to] represent the people as a whole, and the confidence of citizens in this ability and, ultimately, in 
parliamentary democracy.”
“We need to encourage new blood to enter politics and 
must do so on the basis of trying to have the highest 
standards.”
Jim O’Keeffe, MP (during the Irish Dáil Éireann 
Debate on the introduction of a Code of Conduct on 
28 February 2002)
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There are several objectives that drafters should bear in mind when establishing or reform-
ing professional conduct regulation. It should be possible to achieve all of them, but some 
may take higher priority than others (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Objectives of reforming parliamentary standards
• Prevent corruption − Robust professional-conduct regulation can help to prevent abuse of 
office and other forms of corruption. It does so by setting out clear rules for how MPs should 
behave, monitoring how they actually behave, and punishing transgressions. This should 
also make parliament more efficient and productive, providing regulation is not excessive. 
Regulation should not interfere with the exercise of parliamentary duties, e.g., by requiring 
deputies to engage in unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, but it should create a fair and 
stable environment in which MPs can perform their roles of representation, scrutiny and 
legislation.
• Boost accountability − Clear parliamentary standards improve accountability by giving 
the public and the media clear benchmarks against which to judge parliamentary conduct. 
If people believe that the system for regulating ethics is fair and effective, then they can 
more easily trust parliament to get on with its job, in the knowledge that any transgres-
sions will come to light.21 If parliament is not trusted, this undermines its basic functions − 
its capacity to conduct oversight, to represent and to legislate. The rules do not necessarily 
have to be strict. Transparency, combined with effective sanctions, is often crucial.
21 EC EIPA, op. cit., note 6, p.121. 
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• Professionalise politics − Historically, MPs have been elected from a variety of back-
grounds and occupations, and this variety is important to their ability to represent voters. 
However, once in parliament, MPs need to adhere to the same rules about how they conduct 
themselves in office. Just as lawyers and doctors have shared standards across the profes-
sion, MPs need clarity about the standards expected of them. Clear standards can also help 
to unite MPs, allowing them to overcome the obvious political differences to build a sense 
of collegiality. They can also boost the prestige of the office, helping to attract high-calibre 
individuals to the role.
• Meet international standards − The introduction of codes of conduct for public officials, 
promoting integrity, honesty and responsibility, ultimately shows a country’s commitment 
to the implementation and respect of shared international standards and norms. Indeed, 
legally binding documents like the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention against Corruption both call on their signato-
ries to apply and actively promote codes of conduct within their own institutional and legal 
systems. Compliance with such norms can also be important to meeting the conditions for 
joining international associations or accessing aid.
1.2 The Limits of Regulation: Private Life
It is not generally appropriate to regulate the 
private behaviour and personal lives of MPs. 
Media scandals concerning extra-marital af-
fairs or outlandish pursuits should not be the 
subject of regulation. However, private mat-
ters can occasionally come into the purview of 
conduct regulation. For example, in 2011 the 
United Kingdom Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Standards recommended the introduction 
of a clause in the code of conduct for MPs re-
garding circumstances in which the behaviour 
of members in their private lives could threat-
en to bring the House of Commons into disrepute, and thus might be a legitimate subject of 
investigation. The proposed new clause reads:
“the Code does not seek to regulate the conduct of Members in their purely private and personal lives 
or in the conduct of their wider public lives unless such conduct significantly damages the reputation 
and integrity of the House of Commons as a whole or of its Members generally.”22
The new formulation would allow the Commissioner to decide to investigate and the House 
to intervene in extreme cases. The Lithuanian Code of Conduct for State Politicians includes 
a similar clause: “The conduct or personal features of a state politician that are related to certain 
circumstances of his private life and that are likely to have influence over public interests shall not be 
considered private life.”23
22 House of Commons, Committee on Standards and Privileges, Review of the Code of Conduct. 19th Report of Session 
2010–12, United Kingdom, 2011, paragraph 6, p. 4, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmse-
lect/cmstnprv/1579/1579.pdf>.
23 Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Code of Conduct for State Politicians, 
Vilnus, 2006, <http://www.vtek.lt/vtek/ images/vtek/Dokumentai/EN/Legislation/politiku_elgesio_kodeksas.doc>. 
“What we are doing in our private life can be measured 
in relation to the Criminal Code and so on. Public life 
is measured in relation to the code of conduct. With 
such a code I have the opportunity to weigh what I do, 
or weigh what the public and external bodies expect 
of those who represent them in parliament. With such 
a code, ordinary people also have the opportunity to 
weigh my behaviour in relation to the code of conduct.” 
(Kevin Barron MP, UK)
[Comments during the OSCE Conference “Standards 
of Ethics and Conduct for Parliamentarians” in 
Belgrade, November 2011]
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1.3 Immunity for Parliamentarians
There is also a risk that regulation of parliamentary standards could interfere with aspects 
of parliamentary work. For this reason, it is necessary to protect parliamentarians’ rights to 
freedom of speech and freedom of expression in carrying out their role – e.g., when they are 
speaking in parliament, voting or promoting legislative initiatives. Such freedoms are funda-
mental to parliament’s independence and to its ability to carry out its roles of representing 
constituents and scrutinizing executive power. As the Inter-Parliamentary Union notes in its 
Human Rights Handbook for Parliamentarians: 
“Parliament can fulfil its role only if its members enjoy the freedom of expression necessary in order to 
be able to speak out on behalf of constituents. Members of parliament must be free to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas without fear of reprisal. They are therefore generally granted a special 
status, intended to provide them with the requisite independence: they enjoy parliamentary privilege 
or parliamentary immunities. Parliamentary immunities ensure the independence and dignity of the 
representatives of the nation by protecting them against any threat, intimidation or arbitrary meas-
ure directed against them by public officials or other citizens. They thus ensure the autonomy and 
independence of the institution of parliament.”24
These freedoms can be protected in two ways. First, protection can be granted to the state-
ments that parliamentarians make, so that “parliamentarians in the exercise of their functions 
may say what they please without the risk of sanctions, other than that of being disavowed by 
the electorate.”25 This freedom of expression for parliaments is often referred to as the principle 
of “material immunity” or “non-accountability”. An early example can be found in 14th century 
England, when Thomas Haxey, during the session of the English Parliament from 12 January 
to 12 February 1397, submitted a bill denouncing the conduct of the Court of King Richard II. 
He was tried and condemned to death for treason but later granted a royal pardon following 
pressure from the House of Commons.26
In the United Kingdom, the principle of non-accountability is embodied in the 1689 Bill of 
Rights, and in most countries is enshrined in the constitution. 27 It was upheld in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case Castells v. Spain (1992), following the conviction of an MP 
for publishing an article accusing the government of complicity in attacks and murders. The 
ECHR stated that: 
“while freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an elected representative 
of the people. [...] Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of an opposition member 
of parliament [...] call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court [...]”28. 
24 Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human 
Rights: Handbook for Parliamentarians”, No. 8, 2005, pp. 63–64, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
training13en.pdf>. (IPU Handbook)
25 Ibid., p. 65.
26 Council of Europe, “Report on the Regime of Parliamentary Immunity” (Strasbourg, 1996). Available at: http://www.
venice.coe.int/docs/1996/CDL-INF(1996)007-e.asp (visited on 16 August 2012). (CE Parliamentary Immunity)
27 In particular, Article IX states that, “the Freedom of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament ought not 
to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament”. House of Commons, Bill of Rights, United 
Kingdom, 1689, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ aep/WillandMarSess2/1/2/introduction>. 
28 IPU Handbook, op. cit., note 24, p. 116.
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The Court also affirmed that: 
“the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government than in relation to a pri-
vate citizen, or even a politician. […] the dominant position which the Government occupies makes it 
necessary for it to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings”29 
This emphasizes the rationale for non-accountability, to protect parliamentarians – when they 
are executing their functions of representing constituents and scrutinizing the executive − 
from intimidation or pressure from government. However, the protection afforded to MPs’ 
statements in the chamber should not leave individual MPs vulnerable to slander and defama-
tion by their own colleagues. Cases have arisen in several jurisdictions where parliamentarians 
have been unable to sue to clear their names when accused of acting dishonestly in connection 
with parliamentary duties, because it is impossible to draw on parliamentary proceedings as 
evidence to refute claims.30 This issue deserves careful consideration, particularly in societies 
where the media is politicized. 
Table 2: Non-accountability in selected countries31
 
Persons 
covered Scope Duration
Can
immunity 
be waived? When/ How
Croatia MPs Member is only liable 
to disciplinary meas-
ures by the Speaker/
Chamber (i.e., call to 
order, censure) and is 
exempt from criminal 
and civil prosecution 
for opinions expressed 
and votes cast directly 
related to the perfor-
mance of parliamen-
tary duties
Protection is provided 
from the start to the 
end of the mandate. 
After the expiry of 
mandate, opinions 
expressed during the 
mandate are protected 
as well.
No None, since non-
liability cannot 
be waived
France MPs Member is only liable 
to disciplinary meas-
ures by the Speaker/
Chamber (i.e., call to 
order, censure) and is 
exempt from criminal 
and civil prosecution, 
and investigation/ex-
amination, for opinions 
expressed and votes 
cast directly related 
to the performance of 
parliamentary duties.
Protection is provided 
from the start to the 
end of the mandate. 
After the expiry of 
mandate, opinions 
expressed during the 
mandate are protected 
as well.
No None, since non-
liability cannot 
be waived
29 Ibid., p. 116.
30 In the United Kingdom, parliamentary privilege can be waived for the purpose of defamation proceedings, but 
critics argue that this undermines freedom of speech. See House of Commons, Joint Committee on Parliamentary 
Privilege, “First Report”, United Kingdom, 1999, paragraphs 60–82, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
jt199899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/4302.htm>. 
31 McGee Simon, Rules on Parliamentary Immunity in the European Parliament and the Member States of the European 
Union, Brussels, ECPRD Publication, 2001. Also see: Inter-Parliamentary Union, PARLINE Database, 2012, 
<http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>; and CE Parliamentary Immunity, op. cit., note 26. 
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Germany Members 
of the 
Bundestag 
only 
(not the 
Bundesrat)
Member is only liable 
to disciplinary meas-
ures by the Speaker/
Chamber (i.e., call to 
order, censure) and is 
exempt from criminal 
and civil prosecution 
for opinions expressed 
and votes cast directly 
related to the perfor-
mance of parliamenta-
ry duties, made on the 
floor of the Bundestag 
or at parliamentary 
committee meetings.
Protection is provided 
from the start to the 
end of the mandate. 
After the expiry of 
mandate, opinions 
expressed during the 
mandate are protected 
as well.
Yes In the cases of 
“unconstitutional 
defamation” or 
“contempt of 
the Bundestag”, 
either the Public 
Prosecutor or 
the Committee 
on Immunities 
and Rules of 
Procedure can 
call for a vote to 
be taken in the 
House.
Poland  MPs Member is only liable 
to disciplinary meas-
ures by the Speaker/
Chamber (i.e., call to 
order, censure) and is 
exempt from criminal 
and civil prosecution 
for opinions expressed 
and votes cast directly 
related to the perfor-
mance of parliamen-
tary duties
Protection is provided 
from the start to the 
end of the mandate. 
After the expiry of 
mandate, opinions 
expressed during the 
mandate are protected 
as well.
Yes In the cases 
when the rights 
of third parties 
are involved 
(violation of 
personal rights, 
or slander and 
defamation), the 
assembly (the 
Sejm) can lift the 
privilege enjoyed 
by the member 
of parliament
United 
Kingdom
 MPs Member is only liable 
to disciplinary meas-
ures by the Speaker/
Chamber (i.e., call to 
order, censure) and is 
exempt from criminal 
and civil prosecution, 
and investigation/ex-
amination, for opinions 
expressed and votes 
cast directly related 
to the performance of 
parliamentary duties.
Protection is provided 
from the start to the 
end of the mandate. 
After the expiry of 
mandate, opinions 
expressed during the 
mandate are protected 
as well.
Only in lim-
ited cases 
under the 
Defamation 
Act 1996 by 
Members 
or witness-
es before 
commit-
tees.
By individual in 
courts.
Second, parliamentarians may be granted legal immunity from prosecution, and in some cases 
arrest, for ordinary crimes. This is known as “formal parliamentary immunity” or “inviolabil-
ity” and is typically limited in scope – e.g., it only lasts for the MP’s term in office or can be 
waived if certain conditions are met (see table 3). Again, the rationale for this kind of immu-
nity for parliamentarians is rooted in a concern that, historically, the executive branch has 
sometimes sought to remove “troublesome” or critical MPs. As the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU) notes “Prosecutions have often served as an excuse for governments to remove critical 
or obstructive parliamentarians from public circulation.”32 
Inviolability, however, is not equivalent to impunity – that is, it does not mean that parlia-
mentarians are above the law or can commit ordinary crimes without fear of prosecution. Yet 
parliamentarians sometimes act as if this is the case, seeking to take advantage of their im-
32 IPU Human Rights: A Handbook (2005), op. cit., note 24, p. 38. 
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munity rights to abuse power and avoid prosecution for criminal actions, including corruption 
and abuse of office. 
For this reason, it is sensible to limit the extent to which parliamentarians can benefit from 
immunity. In this regard, for example, immunity is usually suspended when an individual is 
caught in flagrante delicto – in the act of committing an offence. When this has occurred, parlia-
mentarians’ immunity can be lifted in most countries, but only with the consent of parliament. 
This entitles parliament to verify that proceedings brought against its members are legally 
founded.33 In Georgia,
“MPs enjoy certain immunity from prosecution. Namely, the legislature’s permission is required in 
order to arrest an MP, to search an MP’s property or to keep in custody an MP who is arrested on the 
spot of a crime. MPs are authorized to withhold information obtained during their work and cannot 
face any charges for opinions expressed as part of their parliamentary activity.”34
Any decision to remove immunity should follow due process and provide adequate opportunity 
for the MP to plead his or her case and appeal.35
Table 3: Inviolability in selected countries36
 
Persons 
covered Scope Duration
Can
immunity 
be 
waived? When/ How
Croatia MPs Member is provided 
with protection from 
criminal proceedings 
and arrest, except 
where the member is 
apprehended during 
the act of committing 
a criminal offence that 
carries a penalty of 
imprisonment of more 
than five years
Protection is provided 
from the start to the 
end of the mandate 
and between early dis-
solution of the house 
and the election of 
a new parliament.
Yes The proposal to lift 
immunity is submit-
ted to the president 
of the chamber by 
the competent state 
authority. The presi-
dent shall forward it 
to The Parliamentary 
Committee on 
Mandates and 
Immunities. The 
Committee submits its 
report to The Chamber 
at the next session. 
The decision to lift im-
munity is taken by the 
chamber.
33 Ibid., p. 65.
34 Transparency International, “Georgia National Integrity System Assessment”, Tbilisi, 2011, p. 33, <http://trans-
parency.ge/en/post/report/national-integrity-system-assessment>. (TI Georgia Assessment) 
35 The ECHR has considered one case in this respect. In Demicoli v Malta (1991) 14 EHRR 47, the ECHR held that 
Article 6(1) applied to parliamentary contempt proceedings and that there had, in the circumstances, been a vio-
lation of that Article’s guarantee of a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.
36 McGee, op. cit., note 31. and CE Parliamentary Immunity, op. cit., note 26. 
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France MPs Member is provided 
with protection from 
criminal and admin-
istrative proceedings 
(though not against 
preliminary investiga-
tion or searches) and 
arrest, except where 
the member is ap-
prehended in flagrante 
delicto, or if it con-
cerns minor offences 
or penalties relating 
to taxation and civil 
matters, or on final 
sentencing.
Limited to the length 
of mandate
Yes A proposal to lift im-
munity is made by the 
Ministry of Justice, 
which transmits it to 
the chamber. After ex-
amination by a Bureau 
delegation, a decision 
is made by the latter in 
camera.
Germany Members 
of the 
Bundestag 
only 
(not the 
Bundesrat)
Member is provided 
with protection from 
criminal and disci-
plinary proceedings 
(including prelimi-
nary investigation or 
searches) and arrest, 
except where the 
Member is apprehend-
ed in flagrante delicto, 
or if it concerns civil 
actions, actions for 
breach of contract or 
preparatory acts for 
civil imprisonment.
Limited to the length 
of mandate
Yes A request can be made 
by a number of bodies, 
including the Public 
Prosecutor, and the 
courts. The Ministry of 
Justice transfers the 
request to the Speaker 
of the Bundestag, 
who then passes it 
on to the Committee 
on Electoral Scrutiny, 
Immunities and Rules 
of Procedure. A vote is 
taken on the commit-
tee’s recommendation.
Poland MPs It applies to criminal 
proceedings, covers all 
offences with the ex-
ception of those lead-
ing to occupational 
responsibility. The 
immunity also protects 
MPs from arrest, pre-
ventive custody, open-
ing of judicial proceed-
ings against them 
and from their homes 
being searched.
Limited to the length 
of mandate
Yes Immunity can be lifted 
by the parliament. In 
this case, MPs must 
be heard. They do not 
have means of appeal.
United 
Kingdom
Members 
of both 
Houses
Immunity from arrest 
and detention for all 
civil actions. But this 
has almost no practi-
cal effect, since there 
are very few civil caus-
es on which a person 
can be detained.
For 40 days after every 
prorogation and dis-
solution.
No No, since inviolability 
cannot be waived.
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1.4  The Context for Reform
Before embarking on any reform of parliamentary ethical standards, it is important to as-
sess what rules already exist, and what other aspects of the context are relevant to reforms. 
Following a normative approach, such a “context” is defined by four interrelated layers of 
norms (see Figure 3 below). As part of the international community, a country might have 
obligations or might wish to commit itself to recognized international norms. At the national 
level, a country’s constitutional norms and ordinary laws are of critical importance to set ethi-
cal standards. Moreover, at the level of parliamentary norms, there may be formal norms – e.g., 
“rules of procedure” – as well as informal ones. Finally, these three layers rest on specific social 
norms and on a shared legal culture, in which political parties play a substantial role in filter-
ing political candidates and raising ethical standards. 
Figure 3: The normative framework in which ethical standards emerge
• International norms − There is no global regulation of parliamentary conduct and no 
right way of setting or enforcing rules.37 However, the 1990s and 2000s saw a series of 
moves towards enshrining certain principles as examples of international good practice in 
democratic governance (see Table 4). Although most of them are recommendations, both 
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) stand out as important legally binding obligations for signa-
tories. The latter, in particular, also includes, under its definition of “public official”, persons 
specifically holding “legislative office”, calling for codes or standards of conduct in order to 
fight corruption and promote integrity, honesty, responsibility and professionalism in the 
performance of public functions. 
In general terms, international norms are ultimately important guides for all countries that 
want to make progress with democratization and fight against corruption. At the same time, 
compliance with international standards can be important to meeting the conditions for join-
ing international associations or accessing aid. 
37 The only area where there is relevant quasi-global regulation concerns the bribery of public officials, which can 
include parliamentarians. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, signed by 38 countries to date, outlaws the bribery 
of foreign public officials. An even larger group of countries has signed the UN Convention Against Corruption. 
These laws are clearly relevant to any reform of the rules about how parliamentarians behave, but under these 
regulations liability lies with the companies that pay bribes rather than the public officials that receive them 
(although the latter may be liable under their own national laws for accepting bribes).
International norms
Constitutional norms 
and national law
Parliamentary norms
Social norms, legal culture and 
political parties
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Table 4. Towards international standards of conduct: A chronology
1996 The United Nations General Assembly adopts a “model international code of conduct for public 
officials” as a tool to guide efforts against corruption.38
1997 The Council of Europe (CoE) adopts the Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, which 
include number 15, “to encourage the adoption, by elected representatives, of codes of conduct”.39
  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is adopted, requiring signatories to implement national legislation 
that outlaws the payment of bribes to foreign public officials – including parliamentarians – in 
international business transactions.40 
1999 The CoE Criminal Law Convention against Corruption obliges states to ban active and passive bribery 
of “domestic public assemblies”.41
 The CoE establishes the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) to monitor compliance with 
anti-corruption standards and further the Guiding Principles. 
  CoE Recommendation 60 of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities on political integrity 
of local and regional elected representatives includes a code of conduct as an appendix, providing 
guidance on how to carry out daily duties in accordance with ethical principles and take preventive 
measures to reduce the risk of corruption. 42
2000  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1214 attests to growing international 
consensus on the necessity of a disclosure mechanism for members’ interest as a minimum in 
regulating parliamentary conduct. 
2005  The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) establishes a legally binding obligation on signatories 
“to apply, within [their] own institutional and legal systems, codes or standards of conduct for the 
correct, honourable and proper performance of public functions”.43 
2006 The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly44 Brussels Declaration sets out recommendations for regulating 
the professional standards of parliamentarians (see box below).45
2010 CoE Resolution 316 of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities focuses on the risks of 
corruption and emphazises the importance of promoting a “culture based on ethical values”. 46
2012 GRECO’s Fourth Evaluation Round is launched, focusing on Corruption Prevention in respect of MPs, 
judges and prosecutors.47
38 United Nations, UN General Assembly, “Resolution 51/59”, 12 December 1996, <http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/51/a51r059.htm>. 
39 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, “Resolution 97 (4) On the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight 
Against Corruption”, 1997, <http://www.coe.int/t /dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Resolution(97)24_EN.pdf>. 
40 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
and Related Documents, 2011, <http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconven-
tion/38028044.pdf>. The definition of “foreign public official” includes “any person holding a legislative, admin-
istrative or judicial office of a foreign country.”
41 Council of Europe, “Criminal Law Convention against Corruption”, Strasburg, 1999, <http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/html/173.htm>. 
42 Council of Europe, “Recommendation 60 on political integrity of local and regional elected representatives”, 
Strasburg, 1999, <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id =847931&Site=COE>. 
43 United Nations, “UN Convention against Corruption”, New York, 2004, Art. 8.2., <http://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08–50027_F.pdf>. 
44 This institution comprises 320 members drawn from all of the OSCE participating states and aims to facilitate 
inter-parliamentary dialogue in relation to the OSCE’s goals. 
45 OSCE PA, op. cit., note 5.
 Ibid., p. 16.
46 See Council of Europe, “Rights and duties of local and regional elected representatives”, Strasburg, 2010, 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1697717&Site=CM>. 
47 The questionnaire is available at: <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp>.
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Excerpt from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Resolution on limiting immunity for 
parliamentarians in order to strengthen good governance, public integrity and the rule 
of law in the OSCE region48
“[The Parliamentary Assembly] urges the Parliaments of the OSCE participating States to 
legislate to:
a. Provide clear, balanced, transparent, and enforceable procedures for waiving parliamentary 
immunities in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations;
b. Provide that the privilege of parliamentary immunity must not apply to actions taken by an 
individual before they have assumed office or actions taken after they have left public office”.49
• Constitutional norms and national laws − In establishing a system to regulate parlia-
mentary standards and deciding what character it should have, drafters should also con-
sider relevant provisions in the constitution, including the balance of power among parlia-
ment and the executive, bureaucracy and judiciary. The constitutional and de facto balance 
of power will shape the incentives and opportunities that MPs face to behave professionally 
and ethically. Hence, this can help to identify the priority areas for regulation. For example, 
if parliament is weak and has little influence over policy-making and law-making, then it is 
less likely that interest groups will seek to buy influence by bribing MPs. The main risks of 
misconduct might rather relate to the use of parliamentary resources.
Moreover, any new rules must be compatible with the constitution. In Serbia in 2010, the 
Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) initiated a procedure of constitutional review before the 
Constitutional Court in response to an amendment of the closing provisions of the ACA Act 
relating to officials already in office.50 The Act states that, where public officials wish to run for 
another public position, the Agency must establish whether there is a conflict of interest.51 The 
new amendment, to which the ACA objected, allowed public officials to retain any office which 
they already held on the day the Act came into force – e.g., existing parliamentarians and pro-
vincial or city councillors could maintain additional positions of mayors or deputy mayors (or 
other positions in the executive branch). The ACA found this to be contrary to the Constitution 
of Serbia and other laws regulating local governments, all of which strictly divide legislative 
and executive power, and hence initiated a procedure before the Constitutional Court. The 
ACA also argued that it was discriminatory to other officials and violated the UN Convention 
against Corruption, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights − conventions to 
which Serbia is a party. In September 2011, the Constitutional Court upheld the ACA com-
48 OSCE PA, op. cit., note 5.
49 Ibid. 
50 Amendments to the Law were published in the Official Gazette of the RS, No. 53/10 on 29 July 2010 and entered 
into force on 6 August 2010.
51 According to the Act, the ACA is responsible for deciding on potential conflicts of interest and may adopt deci-
sions and impose administrative measures where violations are found to have occurred. The ACA also has the 
right to initiate a misdemeanor procedure in cases where public officials fail to act according to the issued deci-
sions. Officials, in turn, have a right to appeal to the Agency Board (the second instance body) and, in cases where 
they are not satisfied with that decision, judicial review is guaranteed by their right to lodge administrative suit 
to an administrative court in Belgrade. The Anti-Corruption Agency Act was established in the Official Gazette 
of the RS, No. 97/08 on 27 October 2008 and came into force on 1 January 2010. 
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plaint.52 It declared the provision unconstitutional and voided it, enabling the ACA to close all 
pending cases.53 The ACA’s argument was not that the positions of MP and mayor necessarily 
conflict, but that holding them concurrently was against the law in Serbia. The case, therefore, 
demonstrates the importance of ensuring that any changes to regulations on parliamentary 
conduct are compatible with the constitutional and legal context.
In some systems, MPs fall under the same system of regulation as that existing for public of-
ficials and hence may be subject to international anti-corruption obligations such as the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption.54 For example, in Georgia, the Constitution and the Law 
on Public Services contain provisions that regulate the conduct of public officials, and these 
also apply to MPs. In other institutional arrangements, separate regulatory systems are in place 
for different types of public roles. For example, distinctions are sometimes made between MPs 
who hold executive office and those who do not. In the United Kingdom, there is a separate code 
for MPs who are simultaneously ministers, which subjects them to stricter monitoring and 
investigative processes. In Ireland, there are different codes for “office holders” (e.g., ministers 
or committee chairs) and “non-office holders”, in some cases bringing together elected and non-
elected officials.55 For certain issues, there may also be merit in expanding regulation to cover 
close associates of MPs, such as key staff and aides, family members and friends.56
Table 5. Examples of codes of conduct for “office holders”
Country Code Date of Adoption Main features
Canada The Conflict of Interest and 
Post-Employment Code for 
Public Office Holders
1994 Provisions regulating the conduct of public 
office holders (e.g., ministers, secretaries of 
state, parliamentary secretaries)
Georgia Law on Public Services 1997 Provisions regulating the conduct of public 
officials, including MPs
Ireland Code of Conduct for Office 
Holders
2003 Provisions regulating the conduct of office 
holders (e.g., prime minister, deputy prime 
minister)
Lithuania Code of Conduct for State 
Politicians
2006 Provisions regulating the conduct of all 
politicians, including MPs
Malta Code of Conduct 
for Ministers and 
Parliamentary Secretaries 
1994 Provisions regulating the conduct of ministers 
and their secretaries
UK Ministerial Code 2010 Provisions regulating the conduct of ministers
52 Beta, Tanjug, “20 Officials to step down due to conflict of interest”, 2011, <http://www.b92.net/eng/news/poli-
tics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=09&dd=08&nav_id=76301>. 
53 This meant that more than 25 individuals were in contravention of the constitution and could have been forced to step 
down from one post. However, intense media coverage prompted most of the officials to resign immediately from one of 
their positions without a formal procedure. Information provided in correspondence by Zorana Marković, head of the ACA.
54 See paragraph A.4 of the thematic report on “Implementation of chapter III (Criminalization and law enforce-
ment) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption” (CAC/COSP/2011/2), distributed at the Conference 
of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 25 August 2011, <http://www.unodc.
org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup2 /2011-August-25–26/V1185447e.pdf>. 
55 Irish House of Representatives, “Code of Conduct for Members of Dail Eireann other than Office Holders”, 2002, 
<http://www.sipo.gov.ie/en/CodesofConduct/TDs/>. And Irish House of Representatives, “Code of Conduct for 
Office Holders”, 2001 <http://www.sipo.gov.ie/en/CodesofConduct/OfficeHolders/>. For the Senate, see Irish 
House of Representatives, “Code of Conduct for Members of Seanad Eireann other than Office Holders”, 2002, 
<http://www.sipo.gov.ie/en/CodesofConduct/Senators/>. 
56 OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9. 
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Drafters should also ensure that the new system for regulating parliamentary standards is 
compatible with other relevant laws, including electoral laws, political party laws, party fi-
nance laws, anti-corruption laws and laws on the status of MPs or on the status of the parlia-
ment. For example, in the United States, the Congressional ethics regime is rooted not only in 
parts of the constitution but also in Standing Rules, separate codes of conduct of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, Rules of the House of Representatives and the House Ethics 
Manual. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and the Congressional Accountability Act of 
1955 apply in some instances as well. 
A country’s electoral system can also affect the balance of power between a political party and in-
dividual MPs, and hence influence the pattern of corruption risks. In a proportional representation 
system with closed party lists, individual MPs may put loyalty to the party above the interests 
of voters. In a system with individual member constituencies, by contrast, accountability to the 
electorate may be stronger, and individual MPs might be more motivated to regulate themselves. 
National laws for party financing are also relevant. As a recent study from the European 
Parliament’s Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy comments: 
“In countries where political parties are financed by the state, there is a different relationship between 
politics and the private sector than in one where parties are financed solely from private and corporate 
donations.”57
The implication is that lobbying by business may pose more of a risk to MPs’ integrity in coun-
tries where parties rely on the private sector for funds.
• Parliamentary norms − Any reform of parliamentary standards regulations also needs 
to take into account existing codes of conduct for legislators or parliamentary staff, rules 
of procedure, standing orders of the parliament, parliamentary resolutions, and guides and 
manuals for legislators.
Informal rules and conventions about how MPs conduct themselves and how parliamentary 
business is executed can also be critical to how parliament works. Examples of such traditions 
include:58
• MPs in the United Kingdom listen to the “maiden speech” of new Members without inter-
vening; 
• MPs refer to one another with the title “the Honourable”, as in Italy, Malta and the United 
Kingdom; 
• MPs might remain in the plenary to listen to at least two interventions after making 
a speech of their own; and
• MPs may be expected to inform another member if they plan to make a negative reference 
to him or her in a speech.
57 European Parliament, Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, Parliamentary Ethics: A Question of Trust, 
Brussels, 2011, p. 14, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/codes_of_conduct_FINAL-ENforweb.
pdf >. (EP Parliamentary Ethics) 
58 Such traditions are often recorded in books about the practice of a particular parliament, e.g., in the United 
Kingdom, see Jack, Malcolm, Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice (London: LexisNexis Butterworth, 2011). 
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Any effort to set professional standards in a parliament needs to take account of these subtleties. 
For example, in some chambers, the speaker or president of the parliament plays an important 
role in enforcing rules and norms during debates, often setting a series of important precedents 
as to what is permissible behaviour. However, the legitimacy of this depends on this leader be-
ing independent. In parliaments where the Speaker does not set aside his or her political party 
allegiance upon assuming office, such a regulatory role may be more controversial.59 
There may also be informal norms in society that affect parliamentary behaviour. In some 
countries, MPs are expected to favour their constituencies, by channelling state resources to 
the population and local interest groups. This is seen as a legitimate part of a legislator’s role 
in many countries, but is regarded as inappropriate in other countries. New rules that ignore – 
or fail to address – existing norms and conventions are unlikely to be effective.
Social norms and the role of political parties − The above-mentioned layers of codified 
norms – international, constitutional, parliamentary – rest ultimately on certain specific social 
norms − customary and uncodified rules that govern behaviour in groups and society. Social 
norms are usually based on a specific “legal culture”, which can be understood here as the 
values, ideas and attitudes that a society holds towards its codified law. It is, therefore, among 
these social norms that shared ethical standards emerge and find legitimacy. 
It is also at the stage of the political candidates’ selection that political parties assume their 
paramount function as ethical gatekeepers of democracy. Indeed, political parties have the of-
ten forgotten responsibility to exert a decisive role in setting ethical standards for future MPs 
and public officials. Because they are the first to screen and select political candidates, political 
parties should function as ethical filters. They should only support those individuals who have 
demonstrated high ethical standards.
Political parties can exert their role as ethical gatekeepers in various ways by:
• Introducing codified ethical standards into their party programmes; 
• Scrutinizing ethically sensitive information regarding candidates during the candidate se-
lection process and, as a consequence, acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate; and
• Creating a mechanism (e.g., party ethics or disciplinary committees) to allow the members 
and electorate to engage directly in the ethical filtering process of its political representa-
tives. In this way political parties could also perform as ethical educators, raising aware-
ness about ethics in the wider society. 
59 In parliamentary practices associated with the Westminster, United Kingdom system, speakers distance them-
selves from their parties upon election to the speakership. 
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Part Two: Tools for Reforming 
Ethical Standards
This part of the study is intended to be a practical guide to be used as a reference for those 
involved in designing or reforming parliamentary ethical standards. 
Section 2.1 considers the question of whether a code of conduct should be seen as an integral 
part of parliamentary standards, assesses the potential benefits of having a code and exam-
ines the different types of code that are in use. Section 2.2 tackles the various ways in which 
a code of conduct can be drafted, offering several examples from OSCE countries.
The subsequent sections in this part of the report consider “what to regulate”. In Section 
2.3, we assess the regulation of interests and assets. This is essential to protecting against 
potential conflicts of interest and corruption, and is an area where tools for regulation are well 
developed. In Section 2.4, we deal with the use of public money in the form of expenses and 
allowances. This is also an area that requires regulation in any parliament, but where there are 
increasing concerns about abuses in many countries. Section 2.5 examines the interaction of 
MPs with lobbyists, inherent potential dangers of this special relationship, and what is needed 
to achieve effective regulation of lobbying based on transparency and accountability.
Finally, in Section 2.6, we evaluate other areas that countries may wish to regulate, but 
where there is less of a consensus on the appropriate level or type of regulation. These issues 
include conduct and language in the chamber, attendance, dress code, gender equality, and 
post-parliamentary employment.
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Figure 4: Dates of adoption of Codes of Conduct in the OSCE region
  1968 United States of America – BOTH HOUSES
  1986 Germany – BUNDESTAG
  1995 United Kingdom – HOUSE OF LORDS
  1995 Malta – UNICAMERAL
  1996 United Kingdom – HOUSE OF COMMONS
  1998 Poland – SEJM
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  2002 Ireland – BOTH HOUSES
  2004 Canada – HOUSE OF COMMONS
  2004 Georgia – UNICAMERAL
  2005 Canada – SENATE
  2006 Latvia – UNICAMERAL
  2006 Lithuania – UNICAMERAL
  2011 France - NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
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2.1 A Code of Conduct
Figure 5: Drafting a code of conduct 
The benefits of a code of conduct 
In many countries, the conduct of parliamentarians is regulated by articles of the national 
constitution and elements of several laws – laws setting rules for holders of public office, laws 
on conflict of interest, laws on asset declarations, laws on parliament, as well as the Criminal 
Code or Administrative Offences code. It could be argued, therefore, that there is no need for 
a separate code of conduct or ethics for MPs.60 Indeed, many parliaments have not developed 
a code of conduct, preferring to rely on the professional standards that exist in the “web” of 
laws, rules of procedure and standing orders. However, the introduction of codes of conduct is 
“a rapidly evolving trend”, with a number of countries reporting that they are “currently con-
sidering the introduction of codes of conduct.”61
Many reformers argue that there is merit in having an overarching document that collates the 
legal and regulatory obligations of MPs and their staff in one place. The Scottish Parliament 
has adopted a code of conduct for members on this basis. It explains all of the rules by refer-
ence to detailed citations and analyses of the relevant parts of other laws.62 This makes it easier 
for MPs to find the rules pertaining to any particular situation in which they find themselves, 
and also helps the media and public to check whether MPs are living up to expectations. 
60 European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD), “Codes of Conduct in Europe: An overview”, 
2001, p. 7, <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/ParliamentaryCodesofConductinEurope_
EN.pdf>.
61 EP Parliamentary Ethics, op. cit., note 59, p. 7.
62 Scottish Parliament, Code of Conduct for Members of the Scottish Parliament, 5th Edition, 2011, <http://www.scot-
tish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Documents/code_final.pdf>. (Scottish Code)
The existing laws, such as:
• codes of conduct 
for legislators or 
parliamentary staff 
• rules of procedures 
standing orders of the 
parliament
• parliamentary resolutions 
• guides and manuals for 
legislators
Other relevant laws, 
including
• electoral laws 
• political party and party 
finance laws 
• anti-corruption laws 
• and laws on the status 
of MPs or on the status 
of parliament
What does it regulate?
• Interests and assets
• Expenses and allowances 
• Conduct in and/or outside  
the chamber 
• Dress code 
• Post-parliamentary 
employment 
What is the approach 
adopted?
The Code of Conduct can be:
• an additional document
• an overarching document
• embedded in legally 
binding documents
What is its content?
• Rule-based 
• Principle-based
• Enforcement mechanisms
What is a Code of Conduct? What are its attributes? What should it be 
compatible with?
Definition: 
Written list of principles 
and/or rules that should 
guide the conduct of MPs
Objectives: 
Provide clarity to MPs and 
public about expectations 
and facilitate accountability
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Another approach is to embed a code of conduct in a legally binding document, as with the 
German or Latvian codes, which are annexes to the Rules of Procedure of the respective par-
liaments. 
Even if they are not legally binding documents, codes can help to regulate conduct simply by 
their existence:
“When everyone clearly knows the ethical standards of an organization they are more likely to rec-
ognize wrongdoing; and do something about it. Second, miscreants are often hesitant to commit an 
unethical act if they believe that everyone else around them knows it is wrong. And, finally corrupt 
individuals believe that they are more likely to get caught in environments that emphasize ethical 
behaviour.”63
Just as the Hippocratic Oath sets standards for members of the medical profession, a code of 
conduct can set standards for parliamentarians and may, by doing so, help to generate a sense 
of professionalism. 
Malta: The added value of a code
From the Preface to the Maltese Parliament Code of Ethics, June 1995, by Speaker Lawrence 
Gonzi:
“This Code of Ethics establishes standards of correct behaviour which the Members of the 
House are themselves proposing to observe as elected representatives serving their country 
in its highest democratic institution. Obviously, the innovation for our parliamentarians does 
not lie in the standards themselves, since every single member has always been expected to 
conduct himself in accordance with the dignity of the institution in which he serves. What is 
new, is the fact that these rules of conduct have now been codified, thus providing a further 
tool for public scrutiny and enhancing accountability.”64
A code can also set goals above and beyond legal requirements, enshrining values that should 
guide the behaviour of MPs and standards to which they should aspire.65 They might seek to 
deter conduct that is not illegal but could nonetheless be considered unethical. Equally, they 
might encourage conduct that is beneficial to a healthy democratic process.66 For example, the 
63 Ibid, p. 8.
64 Malta House of Representatives, “Code of Ethics of Members of the House of Representatives”, 1995, 
<http://www.parlament.mt/codeofethics-mp?l=1>. (Malta Code)
65 The Westminster Foundation for Democracy notes that “code” has different meanings in different legal cultures. 
Whereas in common law traditions a code is seen as a “non-statutory regulation developed by agreement”, in 
civil law traditions, a code is a legally binding statute. 
66 Stapenhurst, op. cit., note 11, p. 18.
“[…] precise sets of ethical rules [such as Codes of Conduct]… provide a clear framework of action in which Members 
can carry out their duties, strengthening their political credibility and thereby their chances of re-election”.
European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Development, Parliamentary Codes of Conduct in Europe: An 
Overview, 2001, p.8.
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Georgian Parliament’s Code of Ethics states that “MPs should actively cooperate with the rep-
resentatives of mass media in the matters which are important for the society.”67
Debate: What are the benefits of a code of conduct?
If the behaviour of MPs is already regulated by the constitution and laws, is a code of conduct 
necessary? There are several reasons why it might be:
• Ease of reference for MPs − All the official rules are explained in one place, meaning that 
the code is a source of guidance for MPs;
• Improved accountability − The code sets clear standards, against which the public and 
media can judge MPs and, if consistently enforced, this may help MPs to protect their per-
sonal lives from media scrutiny;
• Promoting professionalism and collegiality − One scholar has described codes of con-
duct as “what professionals use to make the claim that they are ‘professionals.’”68 The more that 
the role of an MP is seen as respected and prestigious, the easier it will be to attract high-
quality individuals into the service. A code can also serve as a “common denominator”, 
something that MPs share when many other things divide them; and 
• Flexibility − Where a code is adopted by parliamentary resolution, it can be amended and 
updated relatively quickly to reflect emerging problems or changes in norms (although 
there should be a clear procedure by which to make such changes, and those that are part of 
the Rules of Procedure will be subject to the same rules for amending the rules.) 
In terms of content, codes can be either “rules-based” or “principles-based”.69 A rules-based 
code sets out specific behavioural prescriptions, and is likely to be lengthy. A principles-based 
code lists only the principles and values which MPs should follow and to which they should 
aspire. The United Kingdom Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards notes that “a rules-
based approach can be complex and hard to follow, encouraging an overly legalistic approach 
to standards and running the risk of failing to cover every eventuality” whereas a principles-
based code “can set a clear and simple framework, but allows room for differences in interpre-
tation which can create uncertainty and controversy.” 70 However, the two types of codes are 
not mutually exclusive. Any code of conduct must be based on certain principles, even if they 
are implicit, and most will contain some behavioural prescriptions. Moreover, short principles-
based codes of conduct are frequently accompanied by manuals or handbooks, which go into 
great explanatory detail. The United Kingdom House of Commons Code, while only four pages 
itself, is accompanied by a much longer Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members and 
67 Georgian Parliament, “Code of Ethics of the Members of the Georgian Parliament”, p. 2, article 8, <http://www.
parliament.ge/files/1107_17620_548540_CodeofEthics-Eng.pdf>. 
68 Gilman, Stuart, Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting an Ethical and Professional Public Service: 
Comparative Successes and Lessons, (Washington, DC: PREM/World Bank, 2005), p. 4. 
69 United Kingdom House of Commons, Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, “Review of the Code of Conduct 
for Members of Parliament: Consultation Paper”, 2011, <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/pcfs/review-of-
code-of-conduct-2011/Review-of-the-code-of-conduct-2011.pdf>. 
70 Ibid., p.7.
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the United States House of Representatives code is complemented by the 456-page House Ethics 
Manual.71 Figure 6 illustrates the occurrence of certain values in a selection of codes, with 
larger text indicating more frequent occurrence. 
Figure 6. Frequency of certain values in parliamentary codes72
71 United States House of Representatives, “House Ethics Manual”, 2008, <http://ethics.house.gov/Media/
PDF/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf>. 
72 Created on the basis of the codes of conduct of the United Kingdom, United States, Poland, Latvia, Scotland and 
the European Parliament, using wordle.net. 
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Ukraine sets out principles for conduct in public life
In May 2012, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a new law on Rules of Ethical Conduct that 
introduces a body of rules of conduct applicable to individuals performing public functions on 
behalf of the state or a local authority, including the President and the Prime Minister, minis-
ters, members of the Ukrainian Parliament and local councils, civil servants, judges and other 
state officials.73 
The law specifies ten key principles to which conduct should adhere:
• legality;
• political neutrality;
• tolerance;
• acting exclusively in the public interest;
• objectivity;
• confidentiality;
• competence;
• promotion of the public’s trust in the state and local authorities;
• an obligation to challenge and refuse compliance with any unlawful decisions or assign-
ments; and
• conflict of interest avoidance.
The law also provides some guidance on how these principles are to be interpreted and applied, 
although many areas remain ambiguous.74 
2.2 Drafting a Code
The process of drafting a code can be an important exercise for generating debate and discus-
sion on what the rules should be, helping to restore rifts between parliamentarians and society 
and creating a common understanding of what is appropriate conduct and of what, instead, 
represents misconduct. Reforms that are introduced in a hurry, or imposed from outside, are 
likely to meet obstructions at every turn. By contrast, regulatory systems that command wide 
support from MPs can be effective even with a light touch, since they create an environment 
in which deputies want to behave ethically, and the public by and large trusts them to do so. 
The best way to build legitimacy is by consulting widely with relevant groups, listening to 
their concerns and suggestions, and designing a system that addresses those issues. The same 
groups should then be asked to comment on the proposed system, and communication chan-
nels should be established to explain why certain decisions have been made. Public consulta-
73 See Ukrainian Parliament, “Law of Ukraine on Rules of Ethical Conduct No. 4722-VI”, 17.05. 2012,
 <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4722–17>.
74 Commentary by law firm Cameron McKenna notes, for example, that despite including certain provisions pre-
venting officials from receiving illegal benefits or gifts, there is no definition in the law of what would constitute 
a gift or donation.
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tions – through websites, as well as public hearings – on a draft code or changes to a code may 
be a useful tool to incorporate in the drafting process.75
Estonian NGO calls for code of ethics
In Estonia, a scandal in late 2011 over legislators allegedly arranging residence permits for for-
eign businessmen prompted the local NGO, Corruption-Free Estonia, to call for a code of ethics 
for parliamentarians. In December 2011, Jaanus Tehver, chairman of the board of Corruption-
Free Estonia, told the media that, although the scandal did not reveal activity that was illegal, 
it highlighted the need for clearer rules: “the general context is such that we should be more aware 
of the possible risks in connection with such activity […] It is intrinsically a problematic area and we 
have drawn attention to the fact that the rules in this area should be clearer among MPs as well”.76
Sometimes political parties take the lead in driving reform, adopting tougher rules for their 
own members and using them to shame other parties into putting ethics reform on the agenda. 
However, reforms driven by parliament as a whole and rooted in consensus will be easier 
to enforce than those that are developed in a polarised or heavily politicized process. This 
highlights the importance of involving parliamentary authorities and a broad cross-section of 
parliamentarians, as well as senior political party leaders, to obtain cross-party commitment 
to and ownership of the code. Drafters should also think about how the legitimacy of the code 
can best be secured, e.g., whether it is important to have the code adopted by the plenary, or 
whether deputies should be asked to sign the code individually. 
However, it is also important that one body takes responsibility for driving the process of re-
form forwards. Within parliament, the code might be drafted by one of the following:
• A specially appointed ad hoc committee − The European Parliament’s new code of 
conduct was drafted by an ad hoc working group set up in March 2011 by the conference of 
political faction leaders;77
• An existing parliamentary committee − In the United Kingdom House of Commons, 
the Committee on Standards and Privileges leads the drafting and review processes for the 
United Kingdom Code of Conduct; or 
• A working group or sub-committee of a parliamentary management body − In 
France, the Bureau of the National Assembly has this responsibility and in Germany, a sub-
commission of the Bundestag’s Council of Elders reviews the rules of conduct for members 
of the Bundestag. 
75 For example, in 2011 the United Kingdom undertook a public consultation for the review of the House of Commons 
code of conduct. Available at: <http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/pcfs/
consultation-on-code-of-conduct-for-mps/>. 
76 ERR News, “NGO Calls for Parliamentary Code of Ethics”, 2 December 2012, < http://news.err.ee/politics/19ec6211-
dfb0–4a27-a5e6–74fcd820e53a>. 
77 European Parliament, “EP leaders agree to develop new rules for lobbyists and stronger code for MEPs”, Brussels, 
2011, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom /content/20110331IPR16697/html/EP-leaders-agree-to-
develop-new-rules-for-lobbyists-and-stronger-code-for-MEPs>. 
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The drafting group should be selected by a fair and transparent process, and it is of utmost 
importance that the reputations of its members are not tarnished. The group should lead by 
example in making the work of the committee transparent and declaring the interests of mem-
bers, even beyond the requirements for parliament. Ideally, such groups would be led by or 
include key personalities that are widely regarded as ethical leaders and who inspire the con-
fidence of the public.
There are many sources of guidance on how to draft codes. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum on Public Governance cite the seven recom-
mendations of Maesschalck and Schram, who say that a good code should be:
• Clear: legible for all staff members;
• Simple: as simple as possible, but not forgetting that integrity is a complex topic;
• Concrete: uses specifics and examples, avoiding generalizations;
• Structured: is logically centred around a number of core values;
• Consistent: uses concepts in a consistent way;
• Linked: includes cross references to other documents and guidelines; and
• Relevant: moves beyond the obvious to issues where guidance is needed. 78
After wide consultation and successive rounds of re-drafting, the final system should be adopt-
ed by a plenary vote or resolution. This helps to raise awareness of any new rules or institu-
tions as well as demonstrating that the parliament is committed to the new framework. 
Moreover, drafting groups frequently receive assistance from NGOs or OSCE field operations. 
For example, in Latvia in 2004, the mandate committee of the parliament asked an NGO, 
Centre for Public Policy – Providus, to draft a code. It subsequently used this proposal, as well 
as an alternative draft commissioned by another consultant, to form the basis of its own ver-
sion, which was eventually adopted by parliament.79 Examples of OSCE assistance are outlined 
in the following box.
78 OECD, “Towards a Sound Integrity Framework: Instruments, Processes, Structures and Conditions for 
Implementation, 23 April 2009, <http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/
PGC/GF(2009)1&doclanguage=en>.
79 Interview by telephone with Valts Kalnins, Centre for Public Policy-Providus, 17 February 2012.
“What is crucial, no matter what the content of our code of conduct for deputies…is that we should be aware that it 
must be voluntarily accepted. If we do not have the consciousness that this is good, and good for all, then you might 
have a good code, but one that was used exclusively for conflict” 
(Gordana Čomić MP, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of Serbia)
Comments made at an OSCE Conference: Standards of Ethics/Conduct for Parliamentarians in Belgrade, 
November 2011.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina: Building consensus on a new code of conduct, with the OSCE 
Mission’s support
In 2006, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly established a Working Group 
within the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Rights of Children, Youth, Immigration, 
Refugees, Asylum and Ethics (JCHR) to draft a code of conduct for MPs. The Working Group 
was assisted by the Legislative Strengthening Programme of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which, among other things, prepared an “Implementation Package” for MPs. This 
valuable resource was disseminated to all MPs, helping to raise awareness about the content 
and benefits of the code.80
Drafting the code was a slow process and implementation was also delayed owing to elec-
tions. The key problem during drafting was reaching consensus with the Joint Committee 
on Administrative Affairs − which was to play a key role in implementing the code − on how 
to establish complaint procedures in line with domestic legislation, since parliament is not 
a judicial body. Once these issues were resolved, implementation was held up by amendments, 
particularly because procedural rules require both houses to pass the code in identical text. In 
the end, the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples finally adopted amendments to 
the code in identical texts in September 2011. 
The next step was to draft an Implementation Act, which was completed in the second half of 
2011 and approved by the Joint Committee on Administrative Affairs. The Implementation Act 
was rejected by the JCHR, with a request to revise the entire code of conduct. The main argu-
ments involved criticism that the international community had in some way “imposed” the 
code, but there were also inconsistencies with the Conflict of Interest Law. The JCHR then es-
tablished a working group to revise the code of conduct and the accompanying Implementation 
Act. This example demonstrates that adoption by the plenary can sometimes be an onerous 
process with heated debates. However, such debates can be extremely beneficial in raising 
awareness of the code and allowing parliament, the media and the public to think through how 
its various elements will affect parliamentary practice. Adoption by the plenary can also be 
important for establishing the legitimacy of the code.
Serbia: OSCE Parliamentary Support Programme
The Parliamentary Support Programme of the OSCE Mission to Serbia supports programmes 
aimed at professional development of parliamentary staff and assists increased transparency 
of parliamentary work and greater outreach of the parliament towards citizens, civil sector 
and media.
In 2011 and 2012, the Mission to Serbia worked with the National Assembly of Serbia’s Special 
Committee for the Drafting of a MPs’ Code of Conduct. A research paper was drafted to assist 
the National Assembly of Serbia in developing a document for Serbian MPs. This was followed 
80 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Code of Conduct Implementation Package, Legislative Strengthening 
Programme and Parliament Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, June 2008, <http://www.oscebih.org/Default.
aspx?id=4&lang=EN>. This is a very useful resource, with detailed information on procedures for complaints, 
adjudication, sanctions and appeal. 
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by a conference in Belgrade in November 2011, focusing on Standards of Ethics and Conduct 
for Parliamentarians. The conference was hosted by the OSCE Mission to Serbia and organized 
by the Serbian National Assembly, ODIHR and USAID. The conference gathered national and 
international experts, as well as interested MPs and parliamentary staff from Serbia and the 
wider region. It provided expertise and a platform for debate about the importance of a code of 
conduct for MPs.
Georgia: developing, reforming and implementing codes of conduct
The former OSCE Mission to Georgia – jointly with ODIHR − supported the Parliament of 
Georgia in its reform goals, aimed at increasing the capacity of the Parliament to operate in 
a transparent and professional manner. In response to calls from Parliament to provide as-
sistance to the continuous reform processes, the former OSCE Mission supported the develop-
ment of the code of conduct, which was implemented by the non-governmental organization, 
Transparency International Georgia. Discussion on guidelines specified in the code involved 
a wide range of members of parliament and experts. Building on this initial step, a Conference 
on “Codes and Standards of Ethics for Parliamentarians”, jointly organized by ODIHR and the 
Parliament of Georgia, took place on 19 April 2012 in Tbilisi. The conference allowed Georgian 
MPs and parliamentary staff, as well as their counterparts from a number of neighbouring 
countries, to explore the issues involved in developing, reforming and implementing ethics 
regimes for parliaments.
Implementation questions to consider:
• Should the code have the status of law or be merely advisory?
• Should the code include a broad statement of values or principles?
• Will MPs be required to publicly commit to the code when they enter parliament, e.g., by swearing 
an oath or signing a document?
• Will a “manual” be developed, with guidance notes, advisory opinions, examples and past cases? 
Who will draft such notes and opinions? 
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2.3 Assets and Interests
One of the key objectives of professional conduct regulation is to avoid – or limit − conflicts 
of interest. According to the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public 
Service, a conflict of interest is defined as:
“A conflict between the public duties and private interests of a public official, in which the public of-
ficial has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official 
duties and responsibilities.”81 
Codes of conduct often require MPs to commit to putting the public interest above private in-
terests, but other rules and tools are used to regulate the details. 
There are two main approaches in this area. One method is to ban MPs from taking on certain 
roles, through provisions in the constitution or dedicated laws on incompatibility or conflict 
of interest.82 This implies that certain roles are inherently incompatible with holding parlia-
mentary office and/or that MPs cannot be trusted to exercise judgment independent of their 
interests. The alternative is to allow MPs to hold other interests but require them to disclose 
the details in registers of interests and/or declare them before speaking in parliament on 
relevant matters. This model grants the MP some discretion to decide when there is a risk 
of a conflict, although research suggests that, in the United Kingdom at least, the disclosure 
requirement has not always been well respected.83 The disclosure of interests is increasingly 
seen as a minimum requirement for parliaments. The 2000 Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe Resolution 1214 attests to growing international consensus on the necessity 
of a disclosure mechanism for members’ interests as a minimum in regulating parliamentary 
conduct. The Resolution states that: 
“In order successfully to fight corruption, parliaments – in their capacity as a country’s supreme po-
litical authority and instance of control – should, where applicable: introduce an annual system for 
the establishment of a declaration of financial interests by parliamentarians and their direct family.”84
However, the effectiveness of disclosure ultimately relies on the ability and capacity of the 
public, the media and civil society to scrutinize the disclosed interests and judge whether 
conflicts have occurred. In practice, countries frequently combine the two approaches, prohib-
iting the holding of some interests but allowing others – as long as the details are disclosed. 
Another intermediate approach, used in Sweden, is to allow MPs to have certain interests, but 
require them to exclude or recuse themselves from debates or votes where a conflict of inter-
81 OECD, “OECD Guidelines for managing conflict of interest in the public service”, 2007, p. 2, <http://www.oecd.
org/governance/fightingcorruptioninthepublicsector/39691 164.pdf>. 
82 Several OSCE participating States have separate conflict of interest laws, e.g., Latvia has a law on “Prevention 
of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials”, 2002, which was introduced because the Corruption 
Prevention Act was regarded as inadequate in this area. 
83 Gay and Leopold note that: “Significant numbers of MPs appeared to regard registration as sufficient declaration 
of interest, ignoring the specific obligation to declare interests in debate and in committee”. Gay, Oonagh and 
Leopold, Patricia, Conduct Unbecoming: The Regulation of Parliamentary Behaviour (London: Politico’s, 2004). 
84 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Role of Parliaments in fighting corruption”, 
Resolution 1214, 2000, <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link =/Documents/AdoptedText/ta00/ERES1214.htm>. 
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est might arise.85 Likewise in Canada, where there is a dedicated “Conflict of Interest Code”, 
several standing orders of the House of Commons prohibit members from voting on issues in 
which they have “direct pecuniary interests.”86
Incompatibility laws
Attitudes towards the compatibility of public roles and private roles vary considerably in the 
OSCE region, with Canada and the United Kingdom historically far more concerned about 
conflicts of interest when one person holds two public roles, while the United States is more 
concerned about MPs’ private interests.87 Relevant public roles can include being a cabinet 
minister, being a city or county mayor or member of a regional assembly, or being a manager 
of a state-owned enterprise. The public role that is most commonly seen as incompatible with 
holding parliamentary office is that of judicial office, upholding a separation of powers between 
those who make the law and those who enforce it.
Public roles can be regarded as incompatible with parliamentary office for several reasons, for 
example:
• In certain countries, where MPs can become cabinet ministers, there is a concern that their 
will to scrutinize the executive might be impeded by either being part of the government 
or aspiring to be;88 
• Where the other role is an elected one, it can be argued that concerns about being re-elected 
in one role might influence judgements made during the exercise of the other role; and 
• It may not be regarded as appropriate for one individual to receive two salaries from public 
funds. 
Turning to private interests, in many western European countries, it has been the norm that 
MPs are permitted to earn income from employment or business, but must declare it (at least 
above a certain pre-determined level). For example, in the United Kingdom, MPs can be direc-
tors of companies and earn income from the role, but they are required to disclose it in the 
Register of Interests when debating relevant matters. In the United States, meanwhile, numeri-
cal or percentage-based limits are utilised. A congressperson can earn outside income, but it 
should not exceed 15 per cent of pay for Executive Schedule level II (a salary grade for senior 
federal public offices in the United States).
85 Sweden’s “Law on Registration of Members of Parliament’s Engagements and Economic Interests”, 1996, states 
that “A member may not participate in the deliberations of the Chamber or be present at a meeting of a com-
mittee on a matter which concerns him [or her] personally or a close relative.” As cited in National Democratic 
Institute, “Legislative Ethics: a Comparative Analysis”, Legislative Research Series Paper #4, Washington DC, 
1999, p. 8, <http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/026_ww_legethics.pdf>. 
86 Parliament of Canada, “House of Commons Procedures and Practice – Responsibilities and Conduct of Members”, 
2000, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/MarleauMontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch04&Seq=12&Language=E>. (Canada 
Procedures) 
87 Stark, Andrew, “Canada’s Upside-Down World of Public-Sector Ethics”, International Public Management 
Journal,Vol. 8/2, 2005, pp. 187–207.
88 Around one-fifth of MPs in the United Kingdom are on the government payroll or dependent on the executive 
for ministerial positions. See House of Commons, Public Administration Committee of the House of Commons, 
“Smaller Government: What do Ministers do?”, London, 2011, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/530/53002.htm>. 
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Figure 7: Range of possible interests of MPs
In post-communist countries, by contrast, MPs are often prohibited from owning or run-
ning businesses while serving in parliament – e.g., in Armenia, MPs are banned from being 
“entrepreneurs”.89 In Poland, MPs face numerous restrictions on economic activities involving 
state-owned enterprises and should not be involved in any economic activities where they 
could profit from state assets or contracts.
Such provisions have arguably been designed, among other reasons, to limit the access of in-
fluential businessmen to privileged public or administrative information, as well as to prevent 
them from strategically seeking parliamentary office purely to gain immunity from prosecu-
tion and protect their business interests. 
Practices differ widely throughout the OSCE region, as Table 6 illustrates.
89 The definition of “entrepreneur” is contested because of a lack of clarity over whether ownership, for exam-
ple, is necessary. Information provided in an interview with Davit Harutyunyan MP, Chair of the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the Armenian Parliament, 3 October 2011.
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Table 6: Compatibility of various types of interest with the role of legislator 90 
Public-sector interests Private interests
Country Minister Mayor Judge
Company 
director/
employee Shareholder
Armenia Incompatible Incompatible Incompatible Incompatible Permitted**
Canada Permitted Incompatible91 Incompatible Permitted Permitted
France Incompatible Permitted Incompatible Permitted Permitted
Hungary Permitted Incompatible* Incompatible Permitted Permitted
United 
Kingdom
Permitted Incompatible Incompatible Permitted Permitted
Austria Permitted*** Permitted Incompatible 92 Permitted Permitted
Germany Incompatible Incompatible Incompatible Permitted Permitted
Poland Permitted Incompatible Incompatible Permitted**** Permitted****
* Under discussion
** Managing rights must be transferred to trust management for duration of office93
*** Permitted, but not the norm in practice
**** Incompatible in case of state owned companies
Tools for declaring and disclosing interests
Two main types of tool are used to ensure that potential conflicts are revealed. In a Register of 
Interests, MPs declare all sources of income and responsibilities that they hold concurrently 
with office. The information is collected centrally and should be updated frequently. Registers 
were first introduced in the United States and United Kingdom in the 1970s, and spread to other 
countries soon after. The format of registers has evolved considerably, however, with online 
registers increasingly favoured and recommended by the OECD.94 
The types of interest that need to be registered (or declared) vary, but typically include income 
(from employment, share dividends, consultancies, directorships and sponsorships), gifts and 
90 This table was compiled using the IPU database and relevant national constitutions and laws. Countries were 
selected to illustrate a range of policies. However, it should be noted that it is difficult to collect such information, 
since it is often embedded in a number of different laws, and difficult to compare these rules across countries, 
since the definitions of different posts may vary. 
91 Although there are no federal laws that disqualify a municipal mayor (or member of the city council) from sub-
mitting his or her candidacy in a federal election, various provincial and municipal laws would require holders of 
these posts to resign from municipal office before becoming a sitting member of Parliament. Some provincial 
laws make a sitting MP ineligible to run in a municipal election; requiring them to resign their seat in the House 
of Commons before their nomination, e.g., Municipal Act of Ontario, section 258(1). Available at: <http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes /english/elaws_statutes_01m25_e.htm>.
92 The incompatibility is confined to members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Administrative 
Court.
93 This is a solution that is relatively commonly used. For details of model blind trusts see: <http://www.oge.
gov/Financial-Disclosure/Public-Financial-Disclosure-278/Helpful-Resources/Model-Qualified-Blind-and-
Diversified-Trust-Documents/>. 
94 Ibid., p.15.
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hospitality, and non-pecuniary interests. In the Netherlands, three separate registers exist, all 
of which are publicly available. One register covers non-parliamentary income and employ-
ment, another foreign trips not paid for by parliament, and the third is for gifts.95 It is impor-
tant to remember that merely the appearance of a conflict of interest can be damaging. It might 
be impossible to prove that a certain interest influences an individual’s decision one way or 
another, but merely the suspicion can erode legitimacy. The rules should, therefore, include 
a clause requiring legislators to declare any other interests that might reasonably be thought 
to influence their actions, speeches or votes.96 
Debate: Should MPs be allowed to receive gifts?
Rules about the acceptance of gifts vary considerably among OSCE participating States, but 
three main approaches are discernible:
• Ban − Some countries forbid MPs from accepting gifts, e.g., United States members of 
Congress may not accept gifts worth more than 50 dollars. 
•  Disclosure − Other countries allow the acceptance of gifts of any value, but require that 
they must be declared, as in the Czech Republic. 
• Hybrid − A third group of countries allows any gift to be received and requires that gifts 
are declared only if they exceed a certain value, e.g., 50 euros in the Netherlands (although 
some parties in the Netherlands impose tighter rules on their MPs).
Asset declarations are a more recent innovation. MPs are often required to provide details of 
their wealth or assets when they join and leave parliament, as well as regular updates. This 
makes it possible to assess whether an MP appears to be accumulating wealth or assets from 
unknown sources. Asset declarations are becoming increasingly common, often introduced 
with a view to reducing corruption in the bureaucracy, but frequently extended to elected of-
ficials. There is also a trend towards requiring MPs to declare liabilities, since independence 
might also be compromised by receiving credit at below-market rate or being indebted to other 
parties.
All new EU member states, who joined in 2004 and 2007, had adopted some form of register 
or declaration by 2000. Many other states in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus 
have followed suit. In some systems, even candidates for elected office are required to submit 
declarations, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is also a practice that political parties can adopt 
as a confidence-building measure, as in the United Kingdom prior to the 2010 election. 
Electronic submission can significantly improve compliance, reduce the cost of administration 
and increase access and accountability. This has been seen in some countries that have intro-
duced such procedures. In Argentina (not an OSCE participating State), for example, compli-
95 House of Representatives of the Netherlands, “Rules of Procedure”, 2012, Chapter VIIa, section 150a. There is no 
official sanction for failing to list an item.
96 Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption 
(GOPAC), “Handbook on Parliamentary Ethics and Conduct, a Guide for Parliamentarians”, London, 2009, 
<http://www.wfd.org/upload/docs/political_ guidebook_20100630.pdf>. (WFD-GOPAC)
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ance increased from 67 per cent to 99 per cent in less than a year after the introduction of an 
electronic system for financial disclosure.97 However, there are still several OSCE participating 
States where a declaration of interests can only be submitted in paper.98 Registers and declara-
tions also need to be updated frequently, albeit without placing an undue burden upon parlia-
mentarians. The OECD suggests that declared information should be collected “as often as is 
reasonably needed.”99 Yet practices vary widely. In Hungary, financial interests need only be 
disclosed when first taking office (within 30 days) and again at the end of the Member’s man-
date. In the Czech Republic, members must file financial reports annually in June. In Spain, 
interests should be submitted “whenever circumstances change”, leaving it to the member’s 
judgement to decide when this occurs.100
Concerns about privacy 
In many countries, it is becoming the norm for registers and asset declarations to be routinely 
made available to the public, often on the parliament’s website (as in Poland) or in parliamen-
tary visitor information centres (as in the United Kingdom) or on the websites of other state 
bodies (in Georgia, the asset declarations of MPs are available on the website of the Public 
Service Bureau).101 In the United States, the register is not online, but anyone may inspect or 
procure a copy upon providing their identity details (although the information may not be used 
for commercial reasons or for soliciting money for political purposes or otherwise).
However, some commentators warn that excessive disclosure requirements might infringe 
upon the right to privacy. This might deter otherwise qualified candidates from running for 
office102 and could even present a risk to personal security or property.103 Hence, in many coun-
tries, disclosure is partial or limited. In Canada, financial interests are disclosed to the gov-
erning ethics commissioner or office on a confidential basis. The commissioner then devel-
ops a summary for disclosure on the Public Registry, which is available to all citizens. In 
France, members of parliament are expected to disclose their “declaration of estate” only to 
the Committee for Financial Transparency in Political Life, a special semi-judicial monitoring 
body, and the register of interests is available only to monitoring bodies.104 The OECD recom-
mends that, at a minimum: “declared data should be available to investigators for detecting 
cases of possible criminal offences”.105
Moreover, research shows that declarations are most effective in reducing perceived corrup-
tion when they are made available to the public, perhaps because this facilitates scrutiny by 
civil society.106 Indeed, in a number of countries, NGOs are taking on the responsibility of scru-
97 OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9, p.70.
98 Ibid., p.70.
99 Ibid., p.15.
100 SpainElection Law, Article 160(1), <http://legislationline.org/topics/country/2/topic/6>. 
101 TI Georgia Assessment, op. cit., note 35, p. 37.
102 National Democratic Institute, Legislative Ethics: a Comparative Analysis, Legislative Research Series Paper #4 
(Washington DC, 1999), p. 11, < http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/026_ww_legethics.pdf >. (NDI Legislative Ethics)
103 For example, one participant at the OSCE conference on Standards of Ethics and Conduct for Parliamentarians, 
in Belgrade in November 2011, noted that MPs were concerned about the risk of property theft after details of 
their assets – including fine art – were published by the media. 
104 NDI Legislative Ethics, op. cit., note 103, p. 37. 
105 OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9. 
106 Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer,,National Bureau of Economic 
Research, “Disclosure by Politicians”, 2009, Working Paper 14703, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14703.pdf>.
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tinizing declarations. In Slovakia, MPs are required to submit asset declarations by law, but 
these declarations lack the detail necessary to enable full scrutiny. However, an NGO known 
as the Fair Play Alliance has established a programme of activities designed to increase public 
awareness of asset declarations, it: 
• combines data from asset declarations with other public information to build a comprehen-
sive open database; 
•  encourages electoral candidates to submit more complete online asset declarations; and 
•  analyses the asset declarations and the way that public money is spent, with a view to un-
covering conflicts of interest.107
In Austria, a website − www.meineabgeordneten.at – was recently established that compares 
individual MPs’ asset declarations to other publicly available information about their inter-
ests. Their results suggest that around 10 per cent of MPs forget – or omit − to declare income 
from outside jobs. A television programme in Austria also drew attention to the fact that in-
formation on MPs’ interests was difficult to find on the official website of the parliament. The 
parliament immediately responded by placing the relevant information prominently on the 
welcome page of its website.
Implementation questions to consider:
• Which types of interest or role should be banned outright? 
• Which types of interest should be allowed, subject to the disclosure of details or recusal from rel-
evant debates?
• Who will have access to the information? Have concerns about the MP’s right to privacy been 
adequately addressed?
• Should there be penalties for failing to submit information or submitting incorrect information?
• Are there mechanisms in place for verifying submissions?
2.4 Allowances, Expenses and Parliamentary Resources
Media interest in parliamentary ethics often focuses on alleged misuse of parliamentary re-
sources or public money by MPs. This can relate to MPs’ salaries or expenses, the recruitment 
of staff or the use of parliamentary resources for personal or party political purposes. One 
source of controversy is the question of whether MPs should have the power to set and increase 
their own salaries. Such a power is arguably fundamental to MPs’ independence from the ex-
ecutive. However, the public is likely to regard it as an inherent conflict of interest and, indeed, 
parliaments frequently refrain from increasing their own salaries due to fears about public 
107 National Democratic Institute and World Bank, “Strengthening Parliamentary Accountability, Citizen 
Engagement and Access to Information: A Global Survey of Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations”, 2011, p. 41, 
<http://www.ndi.org/files/governance-parliamentary-monitoring-organizations-survey-september-2011.pdf>. 
Also see Fair-Play Alliance: <http://www.fair-play.sk/index_en.php>. 
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disdain for pay rises.108 This can mean that MPs’ salaries fail to keep up with their equivalents. 
That, in turn, raises a risk that it becomes more difficult to attract qualified people for the 
sometimes challenging work of being a legislator. 
However, perhaps more importantly, low salaries also increase the risk that MPs will regard 
their other entitlements – allowances and expenses − as an opportunity to extract additional 
income from the state. This, for example, appears to be the case with MEPs who sign attend-
ance lists only to claim expenses. It was also arguably a contributing factor to major abuse of 
the expenses and allowances system in the United Kingdom that came to light in May 2009, 
when the Daily Telegraph started to publish expense claims that appeared excessive and in-
appropriate. Most controversially, many MPs had “switched” their second home addresses to 
allow them to claim expenses on different properties at different times.109
Under pressure to ensure that nothing similar could happen again, the United Kingdom parlia-
ment handed the responsibility for expenses claims and MPs’ salaries over to a new independ-
ent body, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA). However, the ability of 
IPSA to restore public confidence has been inhibited by criticism of the agency as expensive 
and inefficient.110 This underlines the importance of undertaking a wide-ranging consultation 
when reforming standards. 
In Hungary, a recent proposal aims to abolish transport and rent allowances and instead pro-
vide payment cards that can be used to buy fuel or pay rent on apartments, for those who need 
them.111 This aims to resolve an apparent discrepancy − some MPs claim expenses for commut-
ing between their home and Budapest, despite also receiving a free ticket for public transport, 
and for renting apartments in Budapest, even if they already own their own apartment in the 
capital. 
The employment of family members as secretaries or researchers also raises concerns that 
MPs are using public money to boost family income. Although this is common practice in 
some parliaments (where staff are not drawn from the civil service), a few countries have 
started to regulate the employment of family members, so as to prevent nepotism. In Austria, 
it is now forbidden for MPs in the lower house to employ close relatives as personal assistants 
whose salaries are paid from public funds.112 In the United Kingdom, family members can be 
employed by MPs, but this must be declared.
108 This issue is resolved somewhat in the United States, where Congress votes to increase the salaries of Congress, 
but changes come into effect only in the subsequent term.
109 The Daily Telegraph, “MPs’ expenses: the timeline”, 3 October, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/new-
stopics/mps-expenses/5335266/MPs-expenses-the-timeline.html>. 
110 According to Margaret Hodge, MP and Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts: “Although there has been a 15 
per cent reduction in the amount paid out for MPs’ expenses, that cannot be claimed as an efficiency saving while 
so many MPs report that they are put off from claiming legitimate expenses because the claims process is so 
bureaucratic. [...] The National Audit Office estimates that the combined cost of time spent on making claims is 
around £2.4 million (2.87 million euro) a year. It is also time taken away from serving constituents.” Available at: 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/>.
111 Interview by telephone with Peter Hack, Professor of Law, ELTE University, Budapest (Eotvos Lorand 
Tudomanyegyetem), 14 October 2011. 
112 The Parliamentary Employees Law bans the employment of “close relatives”, defining the term to include 
cousins and co-habitating partners in Article 2; see <http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/ Bundesnormen/
NOR12013826/NOR12013826.html> (in German). 
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Scandals sometimes arise where MPs have used paper with the official parliamentary letter-
head to make personal requests. This is ethically questionable because it suggests that MPs 
are seeking to use their status as parliamentarians to influence private business. Some coun-
tries include rules forbidding this in their codes of conduct or regulatory systems – in Spain, 
members are barred from invoking their position for any commercial, industrial or profes-
sional activity. Nor should parliamentary administrative resources, including staff, be used for 
party political purposes, such as campaigning. Although such a separation can prove hard to 
achieve in everyday political work, Scotland provides a case of good practice. This separation 
is set out in the Scottish code of conduct, with members prohibited from placing parliamentary 
staff in a position “which would conflict with or call into question their political impartiality, 
or which could give rise to criticism that people paid from public funds are being used for party 
political purposes.”113
Implementation questions to consider:
• Who should set the salaries of MPs, and according to what guidelines?
• Should salaries vary according to the responsibilities of an MP, e.g., whether he or she is a member 
of a committee or not?
• Should allowances differ for different types of MPs, e.g., list or constituency?
• Should MPs have autonomy to make purchases, or should expenditure be centralized so that MPs 
are issued payment cards or vouchers?
• Is it acceptable for MPs to employ family members as staff?
• Can a code ensure that incumbent MPs do not use parliamentary resources for their electoral 
campaigns?
2.5 Relations with Lobbyists
In recent years, lobbying has become a relevant element for discussion to those concerned with 
parliamentary ethical standards. The OECD’s Recommendation on Principles for Transparency 
and Integrity in Lobbying defines lobbying as “the oral or written communication with a pub-
lic official to influence legislation, policy or administrative decisions”.114 Indeed, interaction of 
individuals or groups with the legislators in order to advocate for specific interests and influ-
ence political decisions can present some risks in any democratic system.
Although the practice of lobbying is an integral part of any democracy, and lobbyists can 
perform a valuable role to inform legislators on matters of public interest, an illicit use of 
influence in the political system can be extremely dangerous. At least three broad reasons for 
concern exist:
• The risk of inappropriate interactions between lobbyists and politicians, leading to ex-
change of favours or bribery; 
113 Scottish Code, op. cit., note 62, p.49.
114 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendations of the Council on Principles for 
Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, 2010, <http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?Ins
trumentID=256&InstrumentPID=%20250>.
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• Concerns about the role exerted by corporate and powerful groups of interests, which can 
potentially result in an unbalanced distribution of political resources and consideration; 
and
• A growing distrust within the national electorate, who may perceive that key policy deci-
sions are made in a non-transparent and unfair manner, depriving the electorate of any say 
over the national political agenda. 
Transparency registry: the case of the European Parliament
Following the recent “cash for laws” scandal in March 2011, the European Parliament (EP) es-
tablished a working group to draw up a new set of rules to govern the access and behavior of 
lobbyists and to formulate a code of conduct for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 
once again bringing the issues of transparency and ethical standards to the forefront. 
The lobbying sting involved four MEPs, who were accused of agreeing to accept money from 
Sunday Times journalists, posing as lobbyists, in return for watering down banking reform 
legislation. Presenting themselves as banking lobbyists, the journalists attempted to bribe 
MEPs with offers of cash in return for tabling amendments to draft EU legislation. The scan-
dal was highly damaging to the EP image, and the EP President Jerzy Buzek quickly used the 
momentum to reform the EP Rules of Procedure. 
As a result, an inter-institutional agreement between the EP and the European Commission 
was signed in June 2011. This agreement led to a common Transparency Registry, which pro-
vides citizens with direct access to information about those engaged in activities aimed at 
influencing the EU decision-making process. The Transparency Registry offers a single code 
of conduct binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the 
rules” in full respect of ethical principles.115 Registrants to the Transparency Registry shall 
provide:
• Personal data, including the names of people requesting access badges for EP buildings;
• Legislative proposals covered by the registrant’s activities; and
• An estimate of the cost of the registrant’s activities or their overall budget, including fund-
ing received from the EU institutions.
The Transparency Registry does not include information about a given lobbyist’s specific inter-
est. More importantly, registration is voluntary; thus lobbying without registration is allowed. 
As of August 2012, despite having 5,200 individuals registered, a considerably higher number 
of lobbyists are thought to be active in conjunction with EU institutions.116 
115 European Parliament, European Transparency Registry. Available at: <http://europa.eu/transparency-register/
index_en.htm>. 
116 “EU Lobbyist Register Gives Incomplete Picture”, EU Observer, June 2012, <http://euobserver.com/institution-
al/116742>. 
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To strike a balance between the need to exert pressure on politicians on specific public issues 
while ensuring the transparency and accountability of lobbying, more regulations on lobbying 
should be introduced. 
If we examine the existing regulations across the OSCE region, lobbying regulation systems 
tend to include some of the following aspects:
• Registration of lobbyists − Mandatory or voluntary rules on individual registration in 
a dedicated registry, with a varying range of details. Notification of developments in policy 
areas of interest to the particular registrant can be an incentive to register;
• Disclosure of tactics − Requirements to disclose how lobbyists try to influence the politi-
cal agenda (contacts, issues, interests etc.);
• Public access to registration lists − Lobbyist registries can be made available for public 
consultation with appropriate restrictions. Online access to these lists can enhance both 
transparency and efficiency of the system; 
• Spending disclosure − Requirements to provide information regarding income and spend-
ing related to lobbying activities; and
• Revolving-door provision − Requirements establishing a “cooling off” period during 
which former legislators may not become lobbyists,.
How strict these regulatory provisions are can differ significantly from country to country, 
often featuring dissimilar disclosure requirements. However, the ethical peril associated 
with lobbying practices has been internationally recognised, with the UN Convention against 
Corruption calling for an obligation on State Parties to consider criminalising trading influ-
ence. Indeed, specific rules to formalise an otherwise highly informal process should be de-
signed to strengthen ethical standards and procedures. 
Implementation questions to consider:
• Are most lobbying activities carried out in a transparent manner?
• What kind of information should be provided in a lobbyists’ registry? Should it be public? Should 
it include frequency of contact?
• Should the lobbyists’ spending in connection with their professional activities be made publicly 
available?
• Should lobbying regulations be backed by sanctions?
2.6 Other Areas that may Require Regulation
There are several other areas where rules to regulate MPs’ conduct are commonly put in place. 
However, these areas are more controversial and the question of whether or not regulation is 
appropriate is best settled in the local context. For example, systems often include guidance 
or rules about demeanour or proper conduct in the chamber. The Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy, Global Parliamentarians Against Corruption (WFD-GOPAC) Handbook on 
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Parliamentary Ethics and Conduct considers such rules to be a “cornerstone” of any ethics re-
gime, particularly in the early years of a legislature, when it is possible that:
“There is no general acceptance or common understanding of how the rules of procedure should be 
interpreted. In fact, they are highly-contested by MPs, so that debate is fractious and the Speaker’s 
authority frequently questioned.”117
There may be rules on the appropriate use of parliamentary time, so as to avoid filibustering, 
when individual members dominate a debate or digress from the issue in question, perhaps to 
exploit television coverage of the session. Péter Hack, a former MP in Hungary, recalled that 
such behaviour was common in the first, post-transition Hungarian parliament, but was solved 
through reform of the House rules: 
“[This problem] happened in the first four years, but then in 1994 we adopted new House rules which 
helped to solve this problem. We introduced a short pre-agenda debate before the beginning of the day. 
It gave fractions an opportunity to raise issues and react to that day’s events, but it was strictly time 
limited. Within the last decade there is a tradition that mainly the Monday afternoon session starts 
with that general debate and sometimes the government or PM has a short speech about it. But there 
are strict time limits for reactions. Also the chairman of the parliament has the right to withdraw the 
MP if he or she is off topic.”118
However, although changes in the rules can help to make parliament more efficient and ensure 
fair access to parliamentary time, members should also be encouraged to act responsibly in 
adhering to the rules. Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein detail one example in the United 
States Senate where the routine limit of 15 minutes for a vote was ignored. Not only did the 
Speaker allow the vote to stay open for two hours and 51 minutes, until the Republicans had 
secured a majority, but one representative subsequently accused his own party’s leaders of try-
ing to bribe and threaten him during the intervening hours in order to secure his vote.119 Such 
accounts can be extremely damaging to the reputations of parliaments. 
There may also be rules about attendance at debates. The Parliament of Canada Act, for exam-
ple, obliges members to provide a tally of their attendance rate at the end of each month and 
makes deductions from the member’s allowance if they have been absent for more than 21 sit-
tings.120 Rules requiring attendance or setting high quorums can help to address a type of fraud 
known as “ghost voting”, whereby votes are cast on behalf of members of parliament who are 
not physically present in the chamber. The practice is facilitated where voting is electronic and 
requires only the push of a button. Members of the same party often agree to perform ghost 
votes for one another, but members of opposing parties can also cast ghost votes which run 
counter to the beliefs of the absent MP. There have been cases of members rigging their voting 
buttons to allow them to be triggered remotely. 
The problem of ghost voting has recently arisen in a number of OSCE participating States and 
has been the subject of a number of videos − showing deputies pushing several voting buttons 
in succession − that have been widely viewed on the Internet. While some individuals have 
sought to defend the practice as improving efficiency without changing the outcome of the 
117 WFD-GOPAC, op. cit., note 96, p. 6. 
118 Interview conducted by telephone for this report, 14 October 2011.
119 See the opening chapter of Mann, Thomas E. and Ornstein, Norman J., The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing 
America and How to get It Back on Track (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
120 Canada Procedures, op. cit., note 87. 
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vote, there is clearly great potential for abuse.121 Some countries explicitly prohibit the prac-
tice in their parliamentary rules of procedure – for example Bulgaria122 and Georgia123, while 
Lithuania’s Statute of the Seimas warns against “dishonest voting”.124 Countries may wish to 
consider tough sanctions for MPs who cast ghost votes or ask their colleagues to cast votes on 
their behalf.
Many codes of conduct include a commitment to treating one’s colleagues with respect or 
using appropriate parliamentary language, and it is common to ban the use of offensive or 
discriminatory language. Apart from encouraging higher quality debate, such stipulations 
help to ensure an atmosphere that is welcoming for a diverse cross-section of society, as well 
as members of minorities. Numerous examples suggest that under-represented or minority 
groups often suffer from discriminatory or offensive language. 
Many parliaments in the OSCE region have rules about appropriate parliamentary language. 
For example, the Latvian code of conduct requires MPs to avoid “using words, gestures and 
other actions that can be insulting” as well as “offensive or otherwise inappropriate statements 
that may dishonour the Saeima.”125 It also seeks to enshrine a certain kind of political culture, 
stating that an MP “bases his/her decisions on facts and their fair interpretation, as well as 
on logical argumentation […]” The code also encourages tolerance and non-discrimination: 
“[An MP] observes the principles of human rights and does not appeal to race, gender, skin 
colour, nationality, language, religious beliefs, social origin or state of health to justify his/her 
argumentation.”126
The code also includes provisions on insulting gestures and on appearing in public life under 
the influence of alcohol.127
The United Kingdom House of Commons offers a definition of what constitutes unparliamen-
tary language:
“Unparliamentary language breaks the rules of politeness in the House of Commons Chamber. Part of 
the Speaker’s role is to ensure that MPs do not use insulting or rude language and do not accuse each 
other of lying, being drunk or misrepresenting each other’s words. Words to which objection has been 
taken by the Speaker over the years include blackguard, coward, git, guttersnipe, hooligan, rat, swine, 
stoolpigeon and traitor. The Speaker will direct an MP who has used unparliamentary language to 
withdraw it. Refusal to withdraw a comment might lead to an MP being disciplined. The Speaker 
could ‘name’ the Member. MPs sometimes use considerable ingenuity to get around the rules; for 
example Winston Churchill famously used the phrase “terminological inexactitude” to mean ‘lie’.”128
121 See for example, this article on ghost voting in the state legislature in East Tennessee: 
 <http://www.wate.com/story/18559203/east-tennessee-lawmakers-admit-to-ghost-voting-in-legislature>.
122 National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, Rules of Organization and Procedure of the National Assembly 
(2012), Article 11/4, <http://www.parliament.bg/en/rulesoftheorganisations/>. 
123 Transparency International Georgia, “Ghost Voting in the Georgian Parliament”, 2011, 
 <http://transparency.ge/en/node/1302>. 
124 Lithuanian Parliament, “Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania”, 2010, Article 20 (2), 
 <http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_e?p_id=389585>. 
125 Latvian Parliament, “Rules of Procedures of the Saeima”, 2006, p. 36, 
 <http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/rules-of-procedure/>. 
126 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
127 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
128 Excerpt from United Kingdom House of Commons, “Glossary”. 
 Available at: <http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/unparliamentary-language/>.
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In Canada, meanwhile, the Compendium states that:
“The use of offensive, provocative or threatening language in the House is strictly forbidden. Personal 
attacks, insults and obscene language or words are not in order. In dealing with unparliamentary 
language, the Speaker takes into account the tone, manner and intention of the Member speaking; the 
person to whom the words were directed; the degree of provocation; and, most importantly, whether 
or not the remarks created disorder in the Chamber. Thus, language deemed unparliamentary one 
day may not necessarily be deemed unparliamentary on another day. (…) Should the Speaker deter-
mine that offensive or disorderly language has been used, the Member will be requested to withdraw 
the unparliamentary word or phrase. The Member must rise in his or her place to retract the words 
unequivocally.”129
Gender equality in political and public life
A number of OSCE Commitments relate to the need to promote gender equality in political and 
public life. An OSCE Athens Ministerial Council Decision from 2009 calls on the participating 
States to:130
“Consider providing for specific measures to achieve the goal of gender balance in all legislative, judi-
cial and executive bodies, including security services, such as police services;
Consider possible legislative measures, which would facilitate a more balanced participation of women 
and men in political and public life and especially in decision-making;
Encourage all political actors to promote equal participation of women and men in political parties, 
with a view to achieving better gender-balanced representation in elected public offices at all levels of 
decision-making; (…)
Develop and introduce where necessary open and participatory processes that enhance participation 
of women and men in all phases of developing legislation, programmes and policies […]”
In addition to these OSCE commitments, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
calls on national parliaments to “encourage members of parliament to adopt non-sexist lan-
guage and not to resort to sexist stereotypes in the course of their parliamentary activities.”131
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence, to which 23 countries have signed (as of October 2012), including Germany, 
Italy, France and Ukraine, commits signatories to criminalize or impose other sanctions for 
“unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature with the purpose or ef-
fect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”132 Another clause outlaws “psychological 
129  Excerpt from Canadian House of Commons, “Compendium – Rules of Debate” 2006, 
 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/House/compendium/web-content/c_d_rulesdebate-e.htm>. 
130 OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No. 7/09, “Women’s Participation in Political and Public Life,” Athens, 
2 December, 2009, <http://www.osce.org/mc/40710.>. 
131 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Combating Sexist Stereotypes in the 
Media”, 2010, <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/ documents/workingdocs/doc10/edoc 12267.htm>. 
132 Council of Europe, “Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence”,  2011, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/default_EN.asp>. 
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violence”, defined as “seriously impairing a person’s psychological integrity through coercion 
or threats.” This suggests that serious bullying could be covered by new laws.
However, despite various international commitments, the use of discriminatory language con-
tinues to be relatively common in OSCE parliaments and MPs are rarely disciplined for using 
such language. A Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) report warns that sexual harassment cases 
involving parliamentarians often go unpunished, as the officials seek to use their immunity 
as a shield.133 
In addition to upholding rules about non-discrimination, it is important to use gender-sensi-
tive language in codes. The IPU report also has lamented the fact that gender equality is rarely 
mentioned in codes of conduct, yet gender issues can be highly relevant to rules about conduct. 
For example, rules about attendance should find ways to take account of different needs. As 
a recent publication commissioned by ODIHR, Gender Equality in Elected Office: A Six-Step Action 
Plan, notes:
“It is insufficient to get more women candidates into office if the standard rules and procedures of 
democratic bodies are gendered and thus prevent women from operating effectively as elected repre-
sentatives. Thus, encouraging gender-sensitive rules and procedures in elected bodies is also impor-
tant, both through integrating gender issues into all parliamentary committees, debates, action plans, 
commissions, reports, and legislation, as well as through reviewing standard working conditions and 
operational cultures to make sure that there are equal opportunities for women and men members.”134
It may also be considered desirable to include rules or guidelines on dress code, i.e., what kind 
of clothes MPs should wear in the chamber or when conducting parliamentary business. This 
is considered by many to encroach too far on the individual freedom of MPs, and is arguably ir-
relevant to whether they perform their role effectively. On the other hand, some might feel that 
a basic level of decorum needs to be maintained. Such issues can also have political relevance, 
as when, for example, MPs of extremist or nationalist parties attend parliament wearing uni-
forms or symbols of an ideological cause, which may cause offence to other parliamentarians 
or to the public. 
Codes of conduct sometimes regulate the MP’s role as a constituency representative. The 
Scottish code of conduct, for example, provides extensive guidance on how MPs should relate 
to the citizens of their constituencies, in particular whenever an MP has promised to examine 
or investigate an issue raised by a constituent.135 Such rules directly improve accountability 
by creating a benchmark against which constituents can judge an MP’s conduct. The Maltese 
code guards against potential conflicts that arise when an MP is also a minister:
“While it is recognized that in the local situation it is difficult to distinguish in a clear-cut way 
between the work of a Minister as such and his activity as a Member of Parliament representing 
a certain electoral district and it constituents, a Minister is in duty bound to ensure that Government 
funds and facilities are not used by him in an untoward and irresponsible way while he is carrying out 
his duties as a Member of Parliament.”136…“When a Minister needs to take decisions (in a particular 
133 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Gender-Sensitive Parliaments: A Global Review of Good Practice”, 2011, Reports and 
Documents. No. 65–208, p. 70, <http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/gsp11-e.pdf>.
134 Norris, Pippa and Krook, Lena. Gender Equality in Elected Office: A Six-Step Action Plan (Warsaw: ODIHR, 2011), p. 54, 
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/78432>.
135 Scottish Code, op. cit., note 64, section 8.
136 Malta Code, op. cit., note 66. 
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department for which he is responsible) which may have a strong impact on his constituency, he must 
take all necessary precautions to avoid all possible conflicts of interest.”137
Codes can also be used to regulate the treatment of parliamentary staff, imposing duties of 
respect and courtesy, above and beyond legal requirements, to avoid discrimination and har-
assment. For example, the code of conduct of the Scottish parliament states that, 
“Parliamentary staff will treat members with courtesy and respect. Members must show them the 
same consideration. Complaints from staff of bullying or harassment, including any allegation of 
sexual harassment, or any other inappropriate behaviour on the part of members will be taken seri-
ously and investigated.” 138
A particularly controversial area concerns the careers of MPs once they leave office, in their 
“post-public employment”. This is because an MP’s plans for his or her future career can influ-
ence how he or she behaves while in parliament. For example, MPs might abuse their power to 
favour a certain company, with a view to ingratiating themselves and gaining future employ-
ment. Alternatively, once working in the private sector, they might influence former colleagues 
to favour their new employer. The “revolving door”, which refers to the practice of individuals 
moving between parliament or government jobs and business roles in quick succession,139 
raises several different risks of conflict of interest, including abuse of office, undue influence, 
profiteering, switching sides and regulatory capture.140
Some sectors of industry are particularly vulnerable. Defence, energy, transport and health 
care companies are frequent employment destinations for former ministers, civil servants and 
MPs. These are all areas where government is a key buyer and, therefore, where it is easy for 
conflicts of interest to arise. It may be necessary to impose tough restrictions on individuals 
with responsibilities in these areas, in order to protect the public interest.
Some European countries have introduced primary legislation to deal with the revolving door. 
It is rare for public officials to be banned outright from taking on private-sector jobs, but 
they may be required to seek approval before accepting employment or to wait for a certain 
period – a “cooling off period” − before moving into the private sector. For example, Norway 
requires politicians to wait six months after leaving office before taking up a private-sector 
role. Serbia’s Anti-Corruption Agency Act prohibits public officials from employment with any 
organisation engaged in activity relating to the office formerly held for two years after leaving 
office. Elected officials are excluded from this prohibition.141 The rationale for such “cooling off 
periods” is that the capacity to exercise undue influence or use information learned while in 
office decays over time. 
However, while post-public employment is commonly regulated for public officials employed 
in the executive branch, some argue that it is inappropriate to regulate the careers of former 
MPs in this way. The average MP is privy to less confidential information than government 
137 Ibid., Art. 27.
138 Scottish Code, op. cit., note 64, p. 49.
139 This is called “pantouflage” or “cocooning” in France, and as “amakudari” (parachuting from heaven) in Japan.
140 For definitions and a discussion of this issue, see Transparency International UK, “Cabs for Hire? Fixing the 
Revolving Door Between Government and Business”, 2011, <http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/
publications/10-publications/132-cabs-for-hire-fixing-the-revolving-door-between-government-and-business>. 
141 Serbia Official Gazette of the RS, “Anti-Corruption Agency Act”, No. 97/08, 27 October 2008, Article 38, 
<http://www.osce.org/serbia/35100>. 
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employees, and may have little influence over policy. Risks are greater where MPs are also 
ministers or committee chairs and have access to insider information. It can also be argued 
that tough regulation imposes unfair constraints on individuals’ capacity to pursue their ca-
reers, and might have the unintended consequence of deterring individuals from seeking pub-
lic office. Many countries prefer the “soft-law” approach of including recommendations about 
post-public employment in non-binding codes of conduct, as in Ireland and Slovakia.142 
Implementation questions to consider:
• Should demeanour issues be set out in rules or left to informal norms?
• Are practices occurring that disrupt parliament and, if so, can the rules be changed to address 
those?
• Have rules been established in a way that gives full consideration to gender equality?
• Which types of MP are most at risk of “revolving door” conflicts of interest?
• Is it legitimate to restrict the future employment prospects of MPs?
142 Transparency International UK, op. cit., note 140.  
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Part Three: Monitoring 
and Enforcement
In a transparent parliamentary democracy, most MPs are aware of the ethical standards they 
should abide by. In any system, however, there will occasionally be breaches of the rules or 
behaviour that appears to contravene ethical principles. Hence, institutions and procedures are 
needed to monitor and enforce parliamentary standards.
There are three essential elements to this process: an initial complaint about the conduct of 
one or more MPs; an investigation to establish the facts and enable a decision as to whether 
rules or norms have been breached; and, where misconduct is found to have occurred, the 
imposition of appropriate sanctions. The basic elements of the procedure are summarized in 
Figure 8 below.
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Figure 8: Monitoring and Enforcement
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However, these functions can be carried out by a number of different institutions. This will 
depend partly on whether self-regulation by parliaments is preferred to external regulation, or 
whether the aim is to achieve a mix of the two. Within these categories, there are many pos-
sible enforcement bodies. Below we consider the elements one-by-one and discuss the issues 
raised at each stage. 
3.1 Making a Complaint
The right to file a complaint and then to initiate an investigation or inquiry may be given to the 
general public, or to MPs, or both. The following examples demonstrate a range of approaches:
• In the United Kingdom, the Commissioner for Standards can only initiate an investigation 
on a matter after receiving a formal complaint (and cannot act if the complaint was made 
anonymously), although the Committee on Standards in Public Life has recommended that 
the Commissioner be granted the power to initiate investigations ex officio (i.e. by his or her 
own initiative).143
• In the United States Congress, an investigation can be initiated if a complaint is made 
against a member by another member or upon the agreement of the most senior two mem-
bers of the Ethics Committee. Ordinary citizens may also file complaints directly to the 
Ethics Committee. However, in practice, it is common for the general public to route com-
plaints through members.
• In Poland, any MP, parliamentary body or other entity may submit a complaint to the 
Committee on Deputy Ethics. The Committee may also take up a matter on its own initia-
tive. The Committee is empowered to decide whether to pursue the complaint, but must 
inform the complainant of the decision. 
• In Germany, the President of the Bundestag is empowered to initiate investigations into 
possible breaches of the code of conduct.
3.2 Investigating Complaints
Once a complaint has been registered, it is usually necessary to investigate the claim and to 
make a decision as to whether misconduct has occurred.144 In setting up institutions to per-
form these functions, the following questions are important:
• Should the institution(s) that carry out investigation and adjudication be based within par-
liament itself (as in a self-regulating system) or, rather, be external to parliament? 
143 House of Commons, “Power of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards to initiate investigations”, 2010, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011 /cmselect/cmstnprv/578/57803.htm>. Also House of 
Commons, Commissioner for Standards, “Procedural Note: Procedure for Inquiries”, 2012, <http://www.parlia-
ment.uk/documents /documents/Procedural_Note-April_2012.pdf>. 
144 Complaints do not always merit an inquiry. Between April 2011 and March 2012, the United Kingdom Commissioner 
for Standards received 109 complaints in total, but 101 of those were not inquired into because they fell outside 
the remit of the office, did not concern a breach of the rules, duplicated a previous complaint, or provided in-
sufficient supporting evidence.. Data available here: <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/MAR%202012%20
received%20and%20inquired%20into.pdf>. 
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• If the institutions are external to parliament, what is their relationship to parliament, 
e.g., are they appointed by parliament or accountable to parliament, or are they truly 
independent?
In a self-regulating system, parliament maintains control over how and when it sanctions its 
members, with either the speaker or a dedicated internal ethics committee taking respon-
sibility for disciplinary matters.145 Historically, self-regulation has been preferred in many 
democratic systems because of similar concerns to those that inspired the institution of par-
liamentary immunity. It was thought that parliament could only be truly free to scrutinize and 
criticize other institutions of the state if it was regulated only by itself. 
Figure 9. Who monitors compliance and enforces rules?
145 OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9, pp. 36–37.
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Many OSCE participating States have established standing committees within parliament 
with a mandate to investigate and adjudicate issues relating to conduct, including Greece, 
Estonia, Poland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Most re-
cently, in January 2012, the State Duma in Russia approved a resolution on a new Commission 
on Ethics for deputies.146 Another common solution is for the Speaker to be charged with regu-
lating minor matters − pertaining to conduct in the chamber, the use of improper language 
or a failure to obey rules of procedure − while more serious ethical breaches are considered by 
a dedicated committee.147 For example, the President of the Bundestag in Germany is empow-
ered to investigate cases of failure to declare interests. He or she then presents the investiga-
tion to the Bundestag for further action. 
Self-regulation may be desirable in a system where the executive has a tendency to dominate 
parliament. However, it can only work if the public trusts parliament to regulate itself, despite 
the inherent conflict of interest. Those institutions within parliament that are responsible for 
regulating conduct must be willing to scrutinize the conduct of their colleagues or their col-
leagues’ staff,148 and must be able to do so in a non-partisan manner.149 
The OECD recommends that self-regulation should be accompanied by “real transparency” 
and “long-term democratic practices of free and fair elections.”150 This strongly implies that 
pure self-regulation can only be effective and inspire confidence in the context of a stable, 
consolidated democratic tradition, with a transparent register of interests, a trusted electoral 
system and – arguably – free media that play a role in bringing instances of misconduct to 
light. However, serious scandals have recently prompted a move away from self-regulation in 
several countries.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also appears to be moving towards a preference for exter-
nal regulatory bodies. In 2006, the Assembly recommended that participating States establish 
an “office of public standards to which complaints about violations of standards by parliamen-
tarians and their staff may be made” and that the institution should be specially designed to 
receive complaints of suspected violations.151 This institution might specialize in parliamenta-
ry conduct, such as the United States Office of Congressional Ethics, or might be a generalized 
anti-corruption agency upholding standards in all areas of public office.152 The OECD has also 
argued that, on the specific issue of enforcing the rules regarding asset declarations, special-
146 The official website of the State Duma provides only the structure and the regulation of such a Commission, here: 
<http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/committees/136161/>. Moreover, it is not clear exactly which “rules and regula-
tions” the Commission is intended to enforce. Some reports suggest that a draft Code of Ethics for deputies of the 
State Duma is in circulation, but it does not appear to have been approved as yet. A Code of Ethics and Conduct for 
Federal State Servants was adopted in March 2011, but the text is not available. See: <http://www.gazeta.ru/parlia-
ment/info/laws/12832.shtml> and <http://www.ng.ru/style/2011–04–05/16_duma_codex.html>.
147 The President of the Bundestag in Germany is also empowered to investigate cases of failure to declare inter-
ests. He or she then presents the investigation to the Bundestag for further action. 
148 Thompson, Dennis F., Political Ethics and Public Office (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), cited in 
National Democratic Institute, “Legislative Ethics: a Comparative Analysis”, Legislative Research Series Paper #4, 
Washington DC, 1999, p. 20, <http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/026_www_legethics.pdf>. 
149 WFD-GOPAC, op. cit., note 97, p. 31. 
150 OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9, pp.13–14. 
151 OSCE PA, op. cit., note 5, p. 34.
152 In Serbia, the Anti-Corruption Agency is responsible for regulating conflict of interest issues for public officials, 
including those pertaining to MPs. The Agency’s Head, Zorana Markovic, is keen to emphasise that the ACA 
does not make the rules, but rather implements rules made elsewhere. As she put it during an OSCE conference 
on parliamentary ethics and conduct, in Belgrade on 24 and 25 November 2011, “the Anti-Corruption Agency 
shouldn’t decide whether MPs can be mayors or not, but it is an issue which should be regulated.”
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ized, centralized bodies are more suitable for emerging democracies because they facilitate 
greater systematization and professionalization.153
External regulators may be seen as more legitimate than self-regulation, but a question still 
remains as to whom the external regulators should be accountable. If such a body reports to the 
executive branch or, indeed, if it has judicial powers, this threatens to undermine the separa-
tion of powers and interfere with parliamentary sovereignty. Vesting power in a purely exter-
nal regulator might also discourage MPs from taking responsibility for their own conduct. The 
WFD-GOPAC Handbook argues that, in a system of purely external regulation, “there is little 
sense of ownership of the provisions of the principles or rules amongst parliamentarians.”154
One way to retain some of the benefits of self-regulation, whilst introducing enough external 
regulation to inspire public confidence, is to opt for a hybrid system where some elements 
of the process are carried out by parliamentary bodies – whether the Speaker, a dedicated 
standing committee, or an ad hoc committee convened to investigate a particular case − and 
other elements are external. For example, the United Kingdom has an internal standing com-
mittee, the Committee on Standards and Privileges, as well as an external commissioner, the 
Standards Commissioner. Complaints are initially made to the Commissioner, who then con-
ducts an investigation and reports his or her findings to the Committee. This separation of the 
functions of investigation and adjudication is also in line with the right to a fair trial. 
However, although the investigation is conducted externally, the United Kingdom Parliament 
retains control over the process in several ways. First, Parliament appoints the Commissioner. 
The Commissioner thus owes his or her position to the House of Commons, which might ar-
guably sway his or her decision. Second, the Commissioner reports his or her findings to the 
Committee, and it is only the Committee that can then report those to the House and recom-
mend sanctions. Third, the Committee can disregard or simply note the Commissioner’s find-
ings and conduct its own investigation. Thus, the prerogative is still firmly held by Parliament.
153  OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9, p. 14. 
154  WFD-GOPAC, op. cit., note 96, p. 31. 
“We have a committee where we make decisions on penalties to bring against our colleagues. Investigations are 
performed in a separate, different place, but we make decisions on what should happen with some members of 
parliament. It is unpleasant, but necessary if we want to ensure that the public has greater confidence in our 
legislative body than it has now.” (Kevin Barron MP, United Kingdom)
Comments made during an OSCE Conference: Standards of Ethics and Conduct for Parliamentarians in 
Belgrade, November 2011.
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The mandate of France’s Commissioner for Ethical Standards
The National Assembly of France has recently appointed its first independent “déontologue” – or 
Commissioner for Ethical Standards − charged with ensuring respect of the principles set out 
in the National Assembly’s Deputies’ Deontology Code. The Commissioner is appointed by the 
Bureau of the National Assembly, the leading executive body of the chamber, consisting of the 
President of the Assembly, six vice-presidents, three quaestors and 12 secretaries, and requires 
three-fifths of the vote of the Bureau, plus the support of at least one opposition party.155
The Commissioner is mandated to:
• collect and keep MPs’ declarations of interest; 
• confidentially advise and consult any MP on the principles in the Code; and
• prepare an annual report to the National Assembly providing recommendations on how the 
code could be better implemented and respected.
The Commissioner may also be tasked with occasional “general studies” on ethics issues. He 
or she is also obliged to maintain confidentiality and forbidden from sharing information ob-
tained, under penalty of prosecution under the criminal code.
The United States has also moved away from self-regulation in recent years. Oversight of 
the code of conduct used to rest wholly with the legislature, through a Committee of Ethics 
(or Committee on Standards of Official Conduct), comprised of ten legislators. The committee 
members acted as monitors and could recommend appropriate sanctions, although the final 
vote on sanctions was referred to Congress in plenary session. However, in 2008, an independ-
ent and non-partisan watchdog agency called the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) was 
created. The OCE is governed by eight members, all of whom are private citizens; serving 
members of Congress are excluded from holding positions on the board. The OCE is tasked 
with investigating allegations of misconduct and, if they find “substantial reason to believe the 
allegations”, can refer the matter to the Standards Committee in the House.156 
In order to gain and maintain legitimacy, the composition of parliamentary ethics commit-
tees should be representative of parliament in terms of political party balance and gender 
and ethnic balance, and members should be appointed to the committee in a transparent and 
fair manner. One new initiative in the United Kingdom is to appoint members of the public, 
or “lay members”, to the Standards and Privileges Committee.157 This would go some way to 
addressing concerns that self-regulation is prone to an inherent conflict of interest, as well 
as to complaints that Parliament is sometimes remote and out of touch with public expecta-
155 The deontologist, Deontology Code and Declaration of interests were established by a decision of the Bureau 
of the National Assembly on 6 April 2011. Details here: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/presidence/presse/
decision_bureau_deontologie.pdf >.
156 See <http://oce.house.gov/about.html> and <http://oce.house.gov/process.html> for detailed explanations of the 
process.
157 This was debated by the House of Commons in December 2010 and March 2012, with the government ac-
cepting the inclusion of two or three lay members on a newly constituted Standards Committee. See United 
Kingdom House of Commons’ Debates, 12 March 2012, columns 69–84, <http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120312/debtext/120312–0002.htm#12031239000001>. 
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tions. However, it also raises questions about how to appoint such members, what skills are 
necessary and what the status of interventions by these members would be, particularly given 
sensitivity over confidentiality and immunity. 
The chair of such a committee should also command the confidence of the entire parliament. 
Such committees are often chaired by a member of the opposition, although this can be contro-
versial in societies with a highly adversarial political culture or divided political elite. In the 
Polish Sejm, the need for impartiality is addressed by rotating the chairmanship and deputy 
chairmanship of the Ethics Committee every three months among the committee’s members. 
Safeguards during an investigation
The complaints process deals with highly sensitive matters; the entities and individuals in 
charge of this process should bear in mind the potential damage the process can cause to the 
reputations or careers of those involved. Allegations of misconduct might destroy the career 
of an opponent, even if there turns out to be no foundation for the complaint. It is, therefore, 
important to uphold the rights of the accused. An MP should be informed within a certain 
period if a complaint is lodged against him or her and should be given time to respond before 
a preliminary investigation commences. Individual MPs should be able to seek legal advice, 
to defend their actions, and to engage in a right to appeal, but careful consideration should be 
given to how to do this. In Germany, an individual can provide arguments in his or her defence 
only in writing. If allowed a platform, there is a risk that an individual will use it to attract 
media publicity for their original comments or behaviour. 
Rules regarding the disclosure of complaints also need to take into account the rights of MPs. 
If complaints are disclosed immediately, before an investigation has taken place to establish 
whether it can be substantiated, there is a risk that complaints could be used as a political 
tool, to smear a member and ruin his or her career, even if the allegations are unjustified. An 
alternative is to publish reports on complaints only once a decision has been made. A third 
option is to publish details of complaints only if the investigation reveals that they are sub-
stantiated (but only if there is no higher instance for appeal), or only for certain less serious 
alleged infringements. One expert on parliamentary standards in the United Kingdom recalled 
that, when the House of Commons first introduced a procedure for making complaints to the 
Commissioner for Standards, the system was initially abused with “tit-for-tat” claims by MPs 
from opposing parties seeking to smear one another. Partly as a result, it was decided that the 
Commissioner should only issue a report on an investigation if substantive evidence of mis-
conduct had been found.158 
There is also a risk that the person about whom a complaint is made could retaliate against 
the complainant. There might, therefore, be a need to protect complainants by granting them 
anonymity. However, that might, in turn, make the process more vulnerable to smears and po-
liticized accusations, by reducing the cost of making unjustified complaints. Drafters of rules 
158 Information provided in an anonymous interview conducted for this report.
“It is a very difficult and onerous task to try to be the internal watchdog of standards in the House. It is also a great 
privilege. None of the five members would set himself up as a paragon when sitting in judgment of anyone else.” 
Brendan Howlin TD (during the Irish Dail debate on the Code of Conduct, 28 February 2002) 
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on parliamentary conduct should also consider that rulings on misconduct might provoke com-
plaints from parliamentary groups, potentially leading to cases filed before domestic tribunals, 
and eventually even the European Court of Human Rights. 
In cases where misconduct is found to have occurred, public disclosure is often regarded as 
an important component of accountability – as well as a potential sanction. Disclosure allows 
voters to judge the facts of a case and decide whether or not to support a candidate in the 
future, and the threat of losing one’s seat may act as a powerful deterrent to misconduct for 
members.159 Transparent procedures also help to build confidence in the system for regulating 
parliamentary standards. 
Protecting the rights of MPs affected by complaints
The Polish example
The Polish Sejm Ethics Committee is required, according to the regulations of the Polish Sejm 
Ethics Committee of 23 April 2009, to: 
• share complaints immediately with members of the Committee and also with the MP(s) af-
fected by the complaint, typically those about whom the complaint was made; 
• inform those who have submitted a complaint whether or not the Committee will take up 
the matter;
• inform the Deputy who is the object of the complaint as to the time and place when the 
Committee shall consider the matter; and
• inform the object of a complaint if it decides to dismiss a matter.
Moreover, the Deputy about whom the complaint is made has the right to present to the 
Committee his or her verbal clarifications regarding the matter. In case of doubts regarding 
his or her asset declarations, the Deputy may be called upon to present written or oral clarifica-
tions in 30 days.
The United Kingdom example
In the United Kingdom, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege has issued guidance on 
dealing with cases where very serious allegations have been made:
“In dealing with especially serious cases, we consider it is essential that committees of both Houses 
should follow procedures providing safeguards at least as rigorous as those applied in the courts and 
professional disciplinary bodies. At this level the minimum requirements of fairness are for the mem-
ber who is accused to be given:
• a prompt and clear statement of the precise allegations against the member;
• adequate opportunity to take legal advice and have legal assistance throughout;
• the opportunity to be heard in person;
• the opportunity to call relevant witnesses at the appropriate time;
• the opportunity to examine other witnesses; and
• the opportunity to attend meetings at which evidence is given, and to receive transcripts of evidence.
159 WFD-GOPAC, op. cit., note 97.
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In determining a member’s guilt or innocence, the criterion applied at all stages should be at least that 
the allegation is proved on the balance of probabilities. In the case of more serious charges, a higher 
standard of proof may be appropriate.”160
Enforcement of rules on interest and assets
Many commentators argue that Registers of Interests and Asset Declarations can only play an 
effective role in reducing conflicts of interest if there are strong mechanisms in place to make 
the submission of declarations mandatory and to verify that the information provided is cor-
rect. Although many countries require the submission of asset declarations by law, in practice, 
this is not always enforced and the institutions for checking submissions are often weak. The 
institutions responsible for receiving and checking the asset declarations of high-level officials 
sometimes lack the capacity to check submissions.161 
Some argue that asset declarations will only be taken seriously if accompanied by the legal 
right to verify declarations and the institutional capacity to carry out investigations. In Greece 
and Romania, for example, information provided in asset declarations can be verified against 
tax returns. In Romania, asset declarations – which are required for a very large group of public 
officials including MPs and local elected representatives – can also be verified with reference 
to the land registry, motor vehicle registry, real estate registry and other property registries.162 
3.3  Penalties for Misconduct
Sanctions are integral to meaningful regulation and to the overall legitimacy of a parliamen-
tary regulation system, but different types of penalty are appropriate for different constitu-
tional contexts. For the European Parliament, for example, strict enforcement and punishment 
of misconduct are not possible, because legal action can only be taken in the home state and, 
moreover, national legal conditions vary widely. Thus, as one MEP stated, “the public sanction 
by electors is the biggest sanction available”.163 
In most OSCE participating States, systems of parliamentary discipline include a wide range 
of sanctions, from the relatively soft “naming and shaming”, through fines and temporary 
suspensions from office (with loss of pay), up to the ultimate political sanction of loss of a par-
liamentary seat. For conduct that breaks the law, there are, of course, legally enforced penal-
ties. Many of the weaker penalties can be seen as “reputational”, in that they largely affect the 
individual’s standing and reputation with his or her peers and the public. Such measures have 
traditionally been preferred in many OSCE participating States, in the form of a warning, pub-
lic announcement or “call to order”. 
The severity of the punishment should vary according to the severity of the offence and the 
number of infractions. Criminal procedures might run in parallel to disciplinary procedures in 
160 House of Commons, Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, “First Report”, para. 281, 1999, <http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt199899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/4302.htm>. 
161 Transparency International, “EU Anti-Corruption Requirements: Measuring Progress in Albania, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia 
and Turkey”, 2011, <http://www.acrc.org.ua/assets/files/zvity_ta_doslidzhennya/CIMAP_For%20Web[1].pdf>.
162 This requires, however, that property registries are reliable.
163 Interview with MEP for this report, by telephone, 13 October 2011.
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severe cases, or may be initiated if the regular disciplinary process uncovers evidence of a pos-
sible criminal offence. Approaches vary throughout the OSCE region. For example:
• In France, the weakest disciplinary sanction is a “call to order”, followed by many levels of 
tougher sanctions, including cuts in salary graded according to the severity of the offence, 
and temporary suspension for members who are censured twice or insult other dignitaries, 
such as the Prime Minister or members of the Government. The rules allow for defence in 
person by the MP facing the disciplinary measure; 
• In Poland, if the Sejm Ethics Committee finds that a Deputy has violated the Code of Ethics, 
it may impose a warning, a rebuke or a reprimand. 164 The deputy in question is informed 
in writing. If he or she does not immediately register an appeal, or if an appeal has been 
dismissed, the resolution of the Committee is published in the official gazette; and 
• In the German Bundestag, a member who breaches the rules of procedure during debates 
may be called to order, be “named” by the President, or have his or her right to speak during 
a particular debate withdrawn. For more severe violations, an MP might be excluded tem-
porarily from debates, or fined up to 2,000 euros. Similarly, a scale of disciplinary measures 
exists for infractions of the Bundestag’s rules on declaring interests: from a simple warning 
to a fine of up to six months’ remuneration.165
For breaches of rules relating to asset declarations, the full range of sanctions exists within 
the OSCE region. In Italy, not submitting one’s declaration of interests can result in criminal 
action, while in Georgia, submitting an incomplete asset declaration is a crime.166 However, in 
the United Kingdom, Members who fail to declare their interests are normally only required 
to apologize before the House of Commons. In Sweden, individuals are simply named in the 
plenary session. 
Owing to the special status of members of parliament and the constitutional protection that they 
enjoy, the imposition of severe sanctions is a sensitive issue.167 For example, temporary suspen-
sion from the chamber, while relatively common, interferes with MPs’ abilities to represent the 
electorate as a whole, or their constituency specifically.168 There is a risk that suspension could 
be abused to banish MPs from the chamber in order to distort the natural majority. Thus, in some 
countries, such as Austria, suspended members retain their right to vote. Moreover, research 
suggests that more severe sanctions are no more likely to inspire public trust; according to Willa 
Bruce, the existence of a code of conduct is more effective in building public confidence.169
There is a strong norm against removing parliamentarians from office unless very serious 
offences have been committed. The OSCE’s Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension 
(1990) recommends that: 
164 According to Article 4.6 of the Regulations of the Ethics Committee of 23 April 2009. 
165 German Parliament, “Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag”, <http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/
rechtsgrundlagen/go_btg/go06.html>. Also see German Parliament, “Law on Members of the Bundestag and the 
European Parliament”, <http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/rechtsgrundlagen/abgges.pdf>. 
166 OECD Asset Declarations, op. cit., note 9, p. 81. 
167 Ibid., p.16. 
168 MPs can be temporarily suspended from the chamber, inter alia, in Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy and Romania. It is often the preserve of the Speaker to decide on such temporary suspensions.
169 Bruce, Willa. “Codes of Ethics and Codes of Conduct: Perceived Contribution to the Practice of Ethics in Local 
Government”, Public Integrity Annual, CSG & ASPA (1996), cited in Stapenhurst, Frederick and Pelizzo, Riccardo, 
“Legislative Ethics and Codes of Conduct”, WBI Working Papers, 2004, Washington DC: World Bank Institute, p. 14.
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“Candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes […] are permitted to remain in office until their 
term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with 
democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.”170
The United Kingdom is currently debating proposals for introducing a system of “recall” for 
MPs, whereby an MP’s constituency can vote to withdraw his or her mandate. This is provided 
for in the United States, Canada and a number of regional and local assemblies around the 
world171 However, research suggests that such mechanisms are frequently used for party politi-
cal purposes and may become normalized as “standard tool-kit of political conflict” rather than 
being used only as extraordinary measures.172
Within a system, the procedures for escalating from softer to tougher measures should be 
transparent, and the most severe sanctions should be reserved only for grave violations. The 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers and the ODIHR/Venice Commission Guidelines 
on Political Party Regulation recommend that sanctions should be “effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive”.173 Moreover, the aim of regulation should be primarily constructive, to cre-
ate conditions in which professional and ethical conduct emerges as a norm. With this in 
mind, leniency should be exercised in imposing sanctions on any new area of regulation, to 
allow members to become accustomed to new procedures. In Latvia, in the first year that as-
set declarations were introduced, nearly 20 per cent of all forms submitted were incomplete.174 
Regulatory bodies should also be mandated with responsibilities to guide and educate, in ad-
dition to their disciplinary role. 
3.4 Administrative Costs
It is difficult to quantify the costs of regulating parliamentary standards, since many different 
agencies are likely to be involved, but the staffing and budgetary costs should be borne in mind 
when designing a regulatory system. Data are available on the costs of some dedicated parlia-
mentary ethics institutions in the OSCE region. For example, in 2007 the total cost of the Senate 
Ethics Officer of Canada amounted to 1,037,370 Canadian dollars (approximately 800,000 eu-
ros), of which 85 per cent represented salaries and employee benefits.175 The office of the United 
Kingdom Commissioner for Standards, the quasi-independent regulator of the conduct of British 
MPs, cost the taxpayer £598,304 (approximately 717,000 euros) in 2010 and 2011, of which 97.5 
170 OSCE, “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE” (1990), 
Paragraph 7.9, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304>. 
171 Judge, David, “Recall of MPs in the UK: ‘If I Were You I Wouldn’t Start from Here’”, Parliamentary Affairs, May 2012.
172 Gilbert, C, “State Recall Movement Stands Alone in US History”, Journal Sentinel, 2011; and Jackson, D., E. Thompson 
and G. Williams, “Recall Elections for New South Wales? Report of the Panel of Constitutional Experts”, Sydney, 
NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2011, p.22.
173 Guidelines on Political Party Regulation (Warsaw: ODIHR, 2010), p. 80, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/77812>. 
174 Ibid., p. 83. 
175 Canadian Senate, Ethic Officer, “Annual Report of the Senate Ethics Officer 2006–2007”, 2007, Appendix D, 
<http://sen.parl.gc.ca/seo-cse/PDF/AnnualRep0607-e.pdf >.
72
per cent represented staffing costs.176 The United Kingdom Commissioner operates with two sen-
ior members of staff and five to eight support staff, depending on the volume of complaints.177
The printing of materials can also be very costly, and careful consideration should be given to 
whether it is necessary or whether online publication allows adequate scrutiny. In the United 
Kingdom, almost all of the non-staff costs of the Commissioner are printing costs, with the 
annual printing of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests alone accounting for around 
£8,000 (approx. 9,590 euros). The Register is, in any case, permanently available online and 
updated continuously, meaning that the printed version quickly becomes out of date. 
The resources available to an ethics committee or regulator of conduct are essential to how 
well it can fulfil its role and can also affect its independence. The budget of any dedicated 
agency should be stable and secure, to allow maximum independence, but there should also be 
potential for the agency to request additional public resources in periods where an unusually 
high number of investigations are required, e.g., when major or systematic abuses are revealed. 
3.5  Encouraging Compliance
It is important to provide training on the new rules when a system is launched and to continu-
ously refresh training so as to keep it in the minds of individuals as they encounter new prob-
lems. This training should be aimed at all groups that will be regulated by the system, as well 
at as stakeholders who are expected to play a role in scrutinizing conduct, such as the media, 
NGOs and the wider public. Parliamentary staff should also be trained upon beginning their 
employment, because they will need to ensure that systems are set up appropriately and will 
be responsible for day-to-day compliance.
All new MPs should undergo an adequate induction programme when they are elected to 
parliament. Parliamentarians tend to come from a wide variety of backgrounds and may have 
been socialized in the ethical norms of their former professions, not necessarily those of the 
parliament. The first weeks in parliament are a very busy time for most new MPs, but it is im-
portant that they think about the public’s expectations of how they should conduct themselves 
in their new role. Ethics training should demonstrate why misconduct undermines the legiti-
macy of democratic regimes, as well as clarifying what counts as misconduct and identifying 
ways to eliminate it.178 
It can be helpful if an experienced member holds a mentoring session in the chamber, in which 
he or she discusses his or her own experience of entering parliament and the ethical dilemmas 
that have arisen over the years. Such sessions work well if the individual is a respected and 
176 This represents only 0.3 per cent of the total budget of the House of Commons. Data compiled from United Kingdom 
House of Lords, “Annual Report 2010–11, Commissioner for Standards”, 2011, p. 35, <http://www.parliament.uk/
documents/lords-commissioner-for-standards/Annual-Report-2010–11.pdf>. House of Commons, “Thirty-Third 
Report of the Commission, and annual report of the Administration Estimate Audit Committee, Financial Year 
2010/11”, 2011, < http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmcomm/1439/1439.pdf >.
177 In 2010 and 2011, the United Kingdom Commissioner was running concurrent inquiries into 37 complaints, 
25 rolled over from the previous year and 12 new ones. In addition, there are costs associated with the opera-
tions of the Committee on Standards and Privileges, which has one senior member of staff and one administra-
tive assistant. Information is not available on the costs of operating the Committee on Standards and Privileges 
itself; some costs are printed in the sectional return.
178 Stapenhurst, Frederick and Pelizzo, Riccardo, “Legislative Ethics and Codes of Conduct”, WBI Working Papers, 
2004, Washington DC: World Bank Institute, p. 17.
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charismatic speaker, although care should be taken to ensure that any advice given is in line 
with the latest recommendations and rules. A recent report by the Dutch Parliament empha-
sizes the benefits of mentorship:
“The written and unwritten rules of the political game cannot be learned in just a few months. 
However, personal support can make a huge difference to a new MP. Experienced MPs, both former 
and current, are often willing to coach new MPs or to share their experiences with them. Their contri-
bution also enriches the collective memory of the House of Representatives.”179
In addition to training sessions, information can be made available on the internal parliament 
“intranet”. This has the advantage that MPs can access the site when it is convenient to them 
and can find answers to “frequently asked questions”. 
Keeping it current: The case of Georgia180
Georgia’s experience provides an important lesson on the need to ensure that a code of con-
duct does not just gather dust on a shelf. Georgia’s Parliament developed a “Code of Ethics” in 
the summer of 2004, at the suggestion of Transparency International Georgia. Parliamentary 
Chairwoman Nino Burjanadze welcomed the initiative and designated the Head of the Legal 
Issues Committee to facilitate the elaboration of the code with Transparency International 
Georgia. A five-member working group that included all factions in parliament was also set 
up. After intensive discussions and consultations within the working group, as well as with 
NGO representatives, the MPs adopted the code as a general and non-binding declaration in 
October 2004. Most MPs signed the text publicly at a ceremony, while those who could not at-
tend signed it privately some days later. 
However, despite this promising start, the code was not actively used and, when a cohort of 
new MPs was elected in 2008, they were not asked to sign the code. It seems that the code may 
even have been void after the 2008 elections, and research certainly suggests that few MPs 
were aware of the code by then.181 Moreover, the code’s existence has not prevented ethical 
problems from arising, or provided a means to discipline MPs when problems have occurred. 
The code might have been more effective if it had been included in the Parliamentary Rules of 
Procedure or if an Office of Ethics Ombudsman had been established in parliament – two pro-
posals which were made during the drafting process. Some MPs argue that the code was for-
gotten because it was only declaratory and non-binding, while other measures to regulate par-
liamentary ethics did exist and were enshrined in law. Indeed, Georgia’s Parliamentary Rules 
of Procedure have detailed provisions about MPs’ behaviour, and are backed up by a monitor-
ing and enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, the 2004 Code of Ethics 
was not fully taken on board by the incoming Parliament in 2008. The Georgian Parliament is 
currently considering how to revive or re-write the code.
179 Dutch House of Representatives, “Confidence and Self-Confidence – Parliamentary Self-Reflection: Findings 
and Follow-up”, 2009, p. 22, < http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/files/
content/parliamentary-selfreflection_finalreport_117–200327.pdf >. 
180 This box is based on the account provided in Transparency International Georgia, Gogidze, Lasha, “Case Study: 
the Georgian Parliament’s Code of Ethics – Implementation and Recommendations for Reform”, 2012, <http://
transparency.ge/en/post/report/georgias-parliamentary-code-ethics-need-reformation>. 
181 Ibid. 
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Some systems also offer an ongoing advisory service for parliamentarians. The Canadian 
Conflict of Interests and Ethics Commissioner is mandated with providing confidential advice 
to MPs on how to comply with the 2006 Conflict of Interest Act and the MP Code of Conduct, in 
addition to his or her duties of inquiry into breaches of these rules. The Commissioner is also 
mandated with providing confidential information to the Prime Minister regarding conflict 
of interest and ethical issues.182 The Irish Standards in Public Offices Commission is similarly 
tasked with providing guidance on compliance.183 
In some systems, MPs are required to seek advice. German Bundestag members are obliged to 
seek information “in cases of doubt” regarding their duties.184 Alternatively, MPs can simply 
be offered an opportunity to seek advice, or encouraged to do so. The body that provides ad-
vice might also play a role in reviewing the provisions of the code on a regular basis; it is in 
a good position to assess which areas of the code are unclear to members, or which areas of 
compliance are most problematic. However, individuals may feel uncomfortable about asking 
for advice from a body that has the power to investigate their conduct and enforce the rules. 
Freedom of information laws can also inhibit MPs from asking questions, if they fear that their 
questions will later be published in the media. 
General information about the regulatory framework should be made available to the public in 
easily understandable and accessible forms.185 Moreover, discussions of ethical dilemmas and 
of any changes to the rules should be integrated into parliament’s regular educational and out-
reach activities with the public, civil society, students and the media. Moreover, such activities 
help to make the public aware of what an MP’s role entails.
Latvia: Providus NGO puts pressure on MPs to comply with code
In Latvia, in 2004, at the request of parliament, the Centre for Public Policy Providus submitted 
a proposal for a draft code of conduct. Although not all of Providus’s proposals were included in 
the final document,186 the NGO has continued to play an important role in monitoring compliance 
with the code. Its 2007 report, based on monitoring parliamentary debates that year, found that: 
“MPs continued using language that contradicts Clauses 7 and 8 of the Code of Ethics for Members of 
the Saeima [on parliamentary language and non-discrimination]. Multiple violations of these clauses 
by deputies have taken place during plenary sessions. Most breaches of the Code can be divided into 
three categories: the use of vulgarisms to discredit an opponent’s statement, the use of biased language 
or biased (prejudiced) statements for the same purpose, and, finally, the use of personal offences to-
wards other speakers.”187
182 Canadian Parliament, “The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner”, 2007, 
 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0559-e.pdf>. 
183 Irish Parliament, Standards in Public Offices Commission, “Function of the Standards in Public Office Commission”, 
<http://www.sipo.gov.ie/en/AboutUs/Functions/>. 
184 German Bundestag, “Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag”, 2009, p. 85, 
 <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80060000.pdf>. 
185 For example, the United Kingdom Parliament has recently published a new leaflet for the public on complaining about 
an MP. United Kingdom House of Commons, “Complaining about a member of the Parliament”, 2011, <http://www.
parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/pcfs/publications/inquiries/complaints-process/>. 
186 Interview by telephone with Valts Kalnins, Centre for Public Policy-Providus, 17 February 2012.
187 Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS and Open Society Institute, “Shrinking citizenship: Analytical Report on the 
Monitoring of Printed Media, Parliamentary Debates and Legislative Initiative concerning Civic Participation in 
Latvia”, 2007, <http://www.providus.lv/upload_file/Dokumenti_feb07/Tolerance/Shrink_Citi_Eng.doc >. 
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3.6 Updating and Reviewing Standards
Standards necessarily evolve and change over time as norms and expectations of parliamen-
tarians change and new risks arise. Systems for regulating standards, therefore, need to be 
able to adapt.188 A code is never a finished document, but rather remains a work in progress. 
One Canadian MP reflected that:
“We wish to remind Senators of something that the Committee has been mindful of from the begin-
ning: the Conflict of Interest Code for Senators is a work in progress. It is our Code, and only time and 
experience will tell if the choices reflected in this draft were the best possible.”189
Even in a system as old as the Westminster Parliament, there have been fundamental changes 
in the role of an MP in recent years. In the 1960s and 1970s, MPs with constituencies in the 
north of England or Scotland used to base themselves in London most of the time. Now it is 
expected that MPs spend every Friday and most weekends in their constituencies, even during 
parliamentary sessions. This has major implications, such as what constitutes an appropriate 
allowance for an MP for travel or accommodation. In countries that are undergoing transition 
or democratisation, it is particularly likely that the role of parliament may change in a short 
period. Such changes have implications for the questions of whether it is appropriate for MPs to 
hold other roles or earn income from other sources simultaneously with their legislative office.
These issues highlight the importance of having procedures in place that allow for regular 
review and monitoring of the framework. Reviews should provide for open discussion and 
consultation with stakeholders, and ensure that those who will be regulated feel they have 
ownership of the process. 
Implementation questions to consider:
• What funding is available to support the regulation of standards?
• Will training on the new system be developed for MPs and their staff?
• Will confidential advice be available to MPs and their staff?
• What are the most appropriate ways of informing the media, NGOs and the wider public about 
the rules?
• How does the system allow for innovation and reform in its norms and application? 
188 Even the Hippocratic Oath has been updated, with one version that is used widely today having been penned by 
Dr Louis Lasagna in 1964. See WGBH Educational Foundation, “The Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version”, 2001, 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html>. 
189 Third Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament, the 
Honourable Senator David Smith, former Chair, and the Honourable Senator John Lynch-Staunton, former 
Deputy Chair, May 11, 2005. Quoted in Canadian Senate, Ethic Officer, “Annual Report of the Senate Ethics Officer 
2006–2007”, (Ottawa: 2007), p. 24, <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/seo-cse/PDF/AnnualRep0607-e.pdf>. 
76
Conclusions
All parliaments in the OSCE region can benefit from reviewing and reforming the way that 
they regulate professional and ethical standards. As elected representatives, parliamentarians 
are the cornerstone of our democracies. Yet throughout the OSCE region, parliaments can lose 
credibility as a result of scandals, damaging public confidence in democratic institutions. That, 
in turn, hinders the work of the vast majority of MPs who behave professionally and ethically, 
and makes it more difficult to attract the best people into politics. Reviewing and reforming 
standards can help to restore trust in parliaments and raise the profile of the important work 
carried out by MPs. The reform of parliamentary standards provides an excellent opportunity 
for a public debate on what can and should be expected of the individuals voters elect to rep-
resent them. 
Professional and ethical standards for parliamentarians are not a luxury. MPs have a demand-
ing job and are frequently faced with competing claims on their time and power. They some-
times sacrifice a great deal in their personal lives in order to serve the public interest, and 
they operate in a highly politicized environment. Rules and regulations should empower MPs 
to carry out their work and to uphold the independence of parliament from other institutions. 
While rules should not intrude unnecessarily into MPs’ private lives, they are instrumental in 
guarding against the abuse of power for political ends. To keep a working code from one elec-
tion to another, a frequent review and reform of all the ethical standards needs to be sustained. 
There are six steps on the road to reforming the regulation of parliamentary ethical standards:
1 Assess the existing rules and risks. Reformers should first make themselves aware of 
the rules and norms that currently exist, drawing on the country’s constitution and national 
laws, and informal norms operating in parliament. They should identify which problems are 
most severe and which risks the greatest, in order to be able to design reforms that reduce 
those risks. Reformers should also study the experiences of other countries in similar situ-
ations. Any working groups established to lead reform should be selected through a fair 
and transparent process, and should lead by example in making their work transparent and 
declaring their members’ special interests, even beyond the requirements of the parliament. 
2. Initiate a consultation with the aim of producing a document. The reform of par-
liamentary standards should be founded on a wide consultation process, involving parlia-
mentarians, parliamentary staff, political parties, the media and civil society. Broad con-
sultation can help to establish what expectations people have about the conduct of MPs, 
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and spark a discussion on what it is reasonable to expect, possibly enhancing transparency 
and participation through on-line debates and forums. The consultation should be directed 
towards producing a document that sets out common values. The public consultation will 
help frame any subsequent changes to the rules or the institutions that enforce the rules.
3. Reform rules and ethical standards. Whenever steps 1 and 2 reveal weaknesses in the 
parliamentary ethical standard in force, a proper reform process should start within the 
parliament. The reform could touch several different areas, which include but are not lim-
ited to: 
• Declarations of interests and assets; 
• Allowances and expenses;
• Relations with lobbyists;
•  Conduct in the chamber, including parliamentary language; 
• Gender equality;
•  Tolerance and non-discrimination;
•  Attendance and voting rules;
•  Use (and misuse) of parliamentary time; and
•  Post-parliamentary employment. 
4. Reform institutions for monitoring and enforcement. Institutions are needed to mon-
itor adherence and investigate alleged misconduct. Depending on the weaknesses identi-
fied in steps one and two, these institutions should be reformed accordingly. Important 
decisions concern whether the monitoring and enforcement roles should be concentrated in 
parliament or in an external body (see Figure 9), and whether the existing institutions have 
enough power and independence to carry out their roles effectively. 
5. Provide advice, training and support to MPs through outreach. MPs need constant 
advice on new or reformed parliamentary rules and standards throughout their time in of-
fice, and must receive periodic training on sensitive ethical issues. At the same time, the 
public, media and civil society need to be informed about parliamentary ethical standards 
or the reforms of previous rules. Indeed, this should garner close scrutiny of parliamentary 
and MPs’ activities from the public regulatory community, ultimately fighting unethical 
conduct through prevention. 
6. Produce evaluation reports. At the end of each parliamentary term, a thorough assess-
ment of the ethical standards in place and their impact on MPs’ political work is needed. 
The outcome should be published in a report and comparative analysis should be conducted 
using previous assessments. 
This review and reform process should be repeated on a regular basis. Since expectations about 
how MPs should behave change over time and new challenges arise, there should be frequent 
and systematic reviews of the rules and their enforcement. Ideally, it should become part of 
a parliament’s responsibility to review standards at the beginning of each parliamentary term 
to implement them throughout the legislative period. In addition, a comprehensive assessment 
report should be prepared and made available to the public at the end of each term, closing 
the cycle and giving the incoming cohort of MPs valuable information about where to start 
the subsequent review process (see Figure 10). In this way, the review of ethical standards will 
become institutionalized as an automatic task, which is necessary to keep a parliament func-
tioning well and important for building public confidence. 
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Figure 10: Six steps to reforming parliamentary standards
1. Assess the existing
rules and risk
2. Initate 
a consultation process
3. Reform rules and
ethical standards
6. Produce evaluation
report
5. Advise and train MPs 
through outreach
4. Reform institutions for 
monitoring and enforcement
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Glossary190
Abuse of office − when a public official uses powers associated with his or her privileged posi-
tion to maintain a hold on power or to achieve private or partisan gains.
Appearance standard − the concept that conduct should not only be proper, but it should also 
appear proper, because the mere appearance of impropriety risks eroding public trust; often 
invoked when discussing potential conflicts of interest.
Asset declaration − statement detailing the assets (and, sometimes, liabilities) of an individual 
MP or other public official, usually submitted at the beginning and end of a parliamentary term. 
Bribery − provision of a private benefit to an individual in order to influence him or her in the 
conduct of his or her duties, in such a way as to benefit the party paying the bribe (often at the 
expense of the public interest). 
Code of conduct − statement of values, principles or rules to which members of a certain pro-
fession are expected to adhere or aspire. 
Conflict of interest − conflict between the public duties and private interests of a public of-
ficial, in which the public official has private interests that could improperly influence the per-
formance of his or her official duties and responsibilities.
Constituency role − that part of an MP’s work concerned with representing his or her “con-
stituency”, i.e., the voters in the region or locality that he or she represents, where the electoral 
system includes such constituencies.
Cooling-off period − time during which a former deputy is banned from taking on certain 
types of employment or engaging in activities, such as lobbying, to help ensure that he or she 
does not exploit his or her former contacts or insider information for private gain.
Corruption − abuse of entrusted power for private gain.
190 This glossary was compiled with reference to definitions contained in the Transparency International “Plain Language 
Guide”, the OECD (2011) publication, “Asset Declarations for Public Officials: A Tool to Prevent Corruption”, the OSCE 
Aide-Memoire on Gender-Mainstreaming in Projects, <http://www.osce.org/gender/26402>, and the United Kingdom 
House of Commons online glossary, <http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/>.
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Gender equality − absence of discrimination on the basis of gender in opportunities, in the 
allocation of resources or benefits, or in access to services; the full and equal exercise by men 
and women of their human rights. 
Ghost voting − practice where an MP votes on behalf of an absent colleague, either with or 
without that colleague’s consent. 
Good governance − governance that is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, trans-
parent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law; 
assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that 
the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making; responsive to the 
present and future needs of society. 
Incompatibility laws − laws prohibiting an MP from holding a certain position simultaneous 
with being a deputy.
Induction − training programme for new MPs or new members of staff, to familiarize them 
with the institutions and rules.
Inviolability − known as parliamentary immunity, legislative inviolability is an absolute im-
munity from liability that is granted to legislators or parliamentarians during the course of 
their legislative mandate.
Lobby groups − interest groups that seek to influence the formation of legislation; 
Misuse of public funds − use of public funds to achieve private or party political goals, 
rather than to serve the public interest.
Nepotism − occurs when an individual distributes jobs in public office or public contracts to 
relatives or friends. 
Nolan Principles − set of seven principles to guide conduct in public life that were established 
by the United Kingdom Committee on Standards in Public Life in its first report in 1995; the prin-
ciples are: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. 
Public integrity − idea that individuals and institutions in public service should act in a way 
that is consistent with moral or ethical principles and standards. 
Revolving door − movement of public officials and politicians between their public roles and 
employment in the private sector, in quick succession, creating a number of risks of conflict of 
interest.
Rule of law − existence of legal systems and structures that condition the actions of a govern-
ment, and the principle of equality before the law.
Rules of procedure − rules about procedures for parliamentary debates, e.g., how to submit 
an amendment, how to ask a question.
Standing order − written rules under which a parliament conducts business that regulate the 
way members behave, bills are processed and debates are organised; some standing orders are 
temporary and only last until the end of a session or a parliament.
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